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The main topic of this master’s thesis is the proposed EU directive on a financial 
transaction tax. Ten Member States which want to enact the directive by using enhanced 
cooperation are currently negotiating the contents of the proposal. This tax would be 
levied on specific products which are traded on the financial markets. As an example the 
transaction of stocks would be taxed at a percentage of 0.1 percent, and the transaction of 
derivatives at a percentage of 0.01 percent.  
 
The proposed financial transaction tax would enter into force in said ten countries but it 
would still have effects on those countries, which are not planning on participating in this 
taxation system. This is one of the main reasons why this tax has faced a lot of opposition 
in several European Union countries. The main legal problems the tax is predicted to have 
are tax evasion, double taxation, and extraterritorial effect. 
 
The Commission has stated that it is aiming to reach certain objectives with the financial 
transaction tax. These objectives are for example to stabilise the financial markets 
following the financial crisis, and to deter tax evasion. Commission has defended the 
planning of the financial transaction tax by stating that the tax is likely to reach its 
objectives. 
 
The planning of the financial transaction tax began already in 2011 when the Commission 
published the first draft of the proposal. Following this the proposal was last amended in 
2013, but the participating Member States are currently still negotiating the contents of 
the proposal. The participating Member States published a statement in December 2015 
in which they promised that there will be a decision made about the financial transaction 
tax by the end of June 2016. 
 
Keywords: 
European Union, financial transaction tax, enhanced cooperation, tax evasion, 




Table of Contents 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ III 
Literature ................................................................................................................ III 
Legislation and other official sources ..................................................................... V 
Case law ................................................................................................................. VI 
European Court of Justice .................................................................................. VI 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ VII 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introducing the Subject ...................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The Focus and the Scope of This Thesis ............................................................ 3 
1.3 Methodology and Sources .................................................................................. 5 
2. Background ............................................................................................................. 8 
2.1 The Eurozone Crisis ........................................................................................... 8 
2.2 The History of the Financial Transaction Tax ................................................. 12 
2.2.1 Tobin Tax .................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.2. Spahn Tax ................................................................................................ 15 
2.3 Not Such an Original Idea after All - Previous Models of the FTT ................. 17 
2.4 Current Taxation of the Financial Sector in the EU ......................................... 20 
2.5 Development of the FTT .................................................................................. 23 
2.6 Other Regulatory Proposals for the Financial Sector ....................................... 28 
3. The Proposal - What Will It Change .................................................................. 31 
3.1 The Current Proposal ....................................................................................... 31 
3.2 Estimated Impacts ............................................................................................ 33 
3.3 Legal Problems Facing the Proposal ................................................................ 36 
3.3.1 Extraterritorial Effect ................................................................................ 38 
3.3.2 Tax Avoidance .......................................................................................... 42 
3.3.3 Double Taxation ........................................................................................ 46 




4. Supporting and Opposing Arguments ............................................................... 52 
4.1 Supporting Arguments ..................................................................................... 52 
4.2 Opposing Arguments ....................................................................................... 56 
4.3 The European Court of Justice ......................................................................... 60 
5. What Is Next for the FTT? .................................................................................. 64 




























Aarnio A, 'Oikeussäännösten Systematisointi Ja Tulkinta' in Häyhä J (ed), Minun 
metodini (Werner Söderström Lakitieto Oy 1997). 
 
Adema RPC, ’Financial Transaction Tax: Pan-European Market for Master-Feeder 
Structures – or Part of It – Smothered?’ (2014) 42/10 Intertax 653. 
 
Arghyrou MG and Tsoukalas JD, ‘The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, Mechanics and 
Outcomes’ (2011) 34/2 The World Economy 173. 
 
Baldwin RE and Giavazzi F (eds), The Eurozone Crisis (CEPR Press 2015). 
 
Brainard WC, Nordhaus WD and Watts HW (eds), Money, Macroeconomics, and 
Economic Policy: Essays in Honor of James Tobin (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 1992). 
 
Cannas G, Cariboni J, Marchesi M, Nicodème G, Petracco Giudici M and Zedda S, 
‘Financial Activities Taxes, Bank Levies and Systemic Risk’ (2014) WP43 European 
Commission Taxation Papers. 
 
Chaudhry SM, Mullineux AW and Agarwal N, Balancing the Regulation and Taxation 
of Banking (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). 
 
Cloer A and Trencsik S, ‘Alive and Deadly – The European Financial Transaction Tax 
through Enhanced Cooperation: Current Progress’ (2014) 54/7 European Taxation 307. 
 
Constâncio V, ‘The European Crisis and the Role of the Financial System’ (2014) 39 
Journal of Macroeconomics 250. 
 
DeYoung R, Gron A, Torna G and Winton A, ‘Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio 
Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis’ (2015) 
70/6 The Journal of Finance 2451. 
 
Dietlein G, ‘National Approaches towards a Financial Transaction Tax and Their 
Compatability with European Law’ (2012) 21/4 EC Tax Review 207. 
  
Dover R and Frosini J, The extraterritorial effects of legislation and policies in the EU 
and US (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2012). 
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘Review of Current Practices for Taxation of Financial 
Instruments, Profits and Remuneration of the Financial Sector’ (2012) WP31 European 
Commission Taxation Papers. 
 
Fabbrini F, ‘Enhanced Cooperation under Scrutiny: Revisiting the Law and Practice of 
Multi-Speed Integration in Light of the First Involvement of the EU Judiciary’ (2013) 





Federation of Finnish Financial Services ‘Lausunto – Ehdotus Neuvoston direktiiviksi 
yhteisestä finanssitransaktiojärjestelmästä’ (22 November 2011). 
  
Federation of Finnish Financial Services ‘Kannanotto – Mikä on rahoitusmarkkinavero?’ 
(18 October 2012). 
 
Federation of Finnish Financial Services ‘Kannanotto – Rahoitusmarkkinavero’ 
(September 2014). 
Gagnon JE and Hinterschweiger M, Flexible Exchange Rates for a Stable World 
Economy (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2011). 
 
Grahl J and Lysandrou P, ‘The European Commission's Proposal for a Financial 
Transactions Tax: A Critical Assessment’ (2014) 52/2 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 234. 
 
Craig P and de Búrca G, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011). 
 
Habermeier K and Kirilenko A, ‘Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial Markets’ 
(2001) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/01/51. 
 
Hemmelgarn T, Nicodème G, Tasnadi B and Vermote P, ‘Financial Transaction Taxes in 
the European Union’ (2015) WP62 European Commission Taxation Papers. 
 
HJI Panayi C, ‘United Kingdom - The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced 
Cooperation and the UK’s challenge’ (2013) 53/8 European Taxation 358. 
 
Kekkonen J, ’Oikeudellisen muutoksen tutkimisesta – Minun metodini’ in Häyhä J (ed), 
Minun metodini (Werner Söderström Lakitieto Oy 1997). 
 
Kovács L, ‘Bank Taxes in the European Union’ (2012) LVII/3 Public Finance Quarterly 
332. 
 
Larking B, ‘Overview of National Taxation of the Financial Sector’ (2012) 14/2 
Derivatives & Financial Instruments 67. 
 
Millar A, ‘A Financial Transaction Tax – Review of Impact Assessments’ (2012) Report 
prepared for the International Regulatory Strategy Group 2. 
 
Monetary and Economic Department, Triennial Central Bank Survey - Foreign exchange 
turnover in April 2013: Preliminary global results (Bank for International Settlements 
2013) . 
 
Ollivaud P and Turner D, ‘The effect of the global financial crisis on OECD potential 
output’ (2014) 1 OECD Journal: Economic Studies 41. 
Phua S, ‘Convergence in global tax compliance’ (2015) July Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 77. 
 
Polito V and Wickens M, ‘How the Euro Crisis Evolved and how to Avoid Another: 





Randall KC, ‘Federal jurisdiction over international law claims: Inquiries into the alien 
tort statute’ (1985) 18/1 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 1. 
 
Rosenthal S, ’The OECD’s International Tax Proposal: The Action Plan’ (2013) 33/1 
Review of Banking & Financial Law 20.  
 
Schäfer D, ‘The financial transaction tax -- Boon or bane?’ (2012) 47/2 Intereconomics 
76. 
 
Sideris D, ‘Comment on “How the Euro Crisis Evolved and how to Avoid Another: EMU, 
Fiscal Policy and Credit Ratings”’ (2014) 39 Journal of Macroeconomics 375. 
 
Song JG, ‘The End of Secret Swiss Accounts?: The Impact of the U.S. Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on Switzerland’s Status as a Haven for Offshore 
Accounts’ (2015) 35/3 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 686. 
 
Soone A, ’Some Legal Issues with Implementing Commission Proposed Financial 
Transaction Tax in Estonia’ (2014) 42/1 Intertax, 44. 
 
Spahn PB, ‘International Financial Flows and Transaction Taxes: Survey and Opinions’ 
(1995) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/95/60. 
 
Tavares DFL, ’Notes on the Conditions for a Corrective Financial Transaction Tax’ 
(2014) 42/12 Intertax 788. 
 
Tobin J, ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’ (1978) 4/3-4 Eastern Economic 
Journal 153. 
 
Vogel T and Cortez B, ‘The Commission’s Proposal to Introduce an EU Financial 
Transaction Tax’ (2012) 52/2-3 European Taxation 77. 
 
Legislation and other official sources 
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Taxation of the Financial Sector’ COM (2010) 549 final. 
 
Commission, ‘European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a common 
system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’ COM (2011) 594 
final. 
 
Commission, ‘European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax’ COM (2013) 71 final. 
 
Commission, ‘Implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax 
– Analysis of policy options and impacts’ SWD (2013) 28 final. 
 
Commission, ‘Introducing public country-by-country reporting for multinational 




Commission Legal Services Working Paper, ‘Legality of the “counter-party principle” 
laid down in Article 4(1)(f) of the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of FTT’ (March 2014). 
 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards recordkeeping 
obligations for investment firms, transaction reporting, market transparency, admission 
of financial instruments to trading, and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive 
[2006] OJ L 241/1 
 
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/01. 
 
Council, 'Outcome of the Council Meeting' (2015) 3435th Council meeting Economic 
and Financial Affairs Brussels. 
 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax [2006] OJ L347. 
 
Council Legal Services opinion ‘Opinion of the legal services department of the Council 
of the European Union on the Legality of the counterparty-based deemed establishment 
of financial institutions (Article 4(1) point f) of the proposal’ 2013/0045 (CNS). 
 
Eurobarometer Survey 74, ‘Economic Governance in the European Union’ (January 
2011).  
 
European Central Bank, ‘Opinion Of The European Central Bank At The Request Of The 
Belgian Ministry Of Finance On A Draft Law Introducing A Tax On Exchange 




European Court of Justice 
Case C-209/13 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the 
European Union (UK v Council) [2014]. 
 
Case C-255/02 Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd and County Wide 
Property Investments Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (Halifax) [2006] I-1609. 
 
Case T-113/96 Edouard Dubois et Fils SA v Council of the European Union and 










AEOI  Automatic Exchange of Information 
CIT  Corporate Income Tax 
CJEU  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
CLS  The European Council Legal Service 
CRS  Common Reporting Standard 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECOFIN  The Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union 
EU   European Union 
FAT  Financial Activities Tax 
FATCA  Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
FFI  Federation of Finnish Financial Services 
FTT  Financial Transaction Tax 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
SDRT  Stamp Duty Reserve Tax 
SEC  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
SPV  Special Purpose Vehicles 
STT  Securities Transaction Tax 
TEU  Treaty on the European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
















1.1 Introducing the Subject 
 
Recently there have been several significant developments in the area of international 
financial taxation. There are both political and economic momentum for the governments 
to legislate the financial sector, especially since the fight against tax evasion has gained 
substantial support. Additionally, the recent financial crisis hit the European and global 
economies hard. A lot of people are still angered by the actions of financial institutions 
prior and during the crisis, and how much it has affected everyday people. Therefore, 
there is a lot of pressure from voters to make financial institutions contribute more 
towards the common budget.1 
 
There are a number theories on the reasons why the recent financial crisis had such a 
major impact on the European Union economy. However, the most popular theories on 
the causes of crisis revolve around the US subprime crisis, excessive foreign lending in 
the EU and irresponsible fiscal policies.2 The EU legislators are determined to prevent 
another financial crisis from affecting the Eurozone as catastrophically as the previously 
crisis did. This is one of the reasons why there are currently several legislation projects 
ongoing in the financial sector within the EU.3 
 
For the last five years, since 2011, the Commission has attempted to draft a financial 
transaction tax (hereinafter referred to as the FTT) which would be implemented within 
the EU.4 The idea of levying taxes on financial transactions has existed for decades, but 
it has never been implemented on an international level, only within the domestic 
jurisdictions of individual countries. The theory of transaction taxes was originally 
introduced in the seventies by James Tobin. This is why typically this type of tax is known 
as ‘the Tobin Tax’. A financial transaction tax is usually a small tax levied on certain type 
                                                 
1 Barry Larking, ‘Overview of National Taxation of the Financial Sector’ (2012) 14/2 Derivatives & 
Financial Instruments 67, 68. 
2 Richard E Baldwin and Francesco Giavazzi (eds), The Eurozone Crisis (CEPR Press 2015) 19. 
3 Commission, ‘European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’ COM (2011) 594 final, 3. 
4 Thorsten Vogel and Benjamin Cortez, ‘The Commission’s Proposal to Introduce an EU Financial 




of securities5 and derivatives.6 The European Union model of the FTT would levy a tax 
at a rate of 0.1% for transactions of shares and bonds, and 0.01% for derivatives.7 
Moreover, several countries in the EU and globally have decided to implement their own, 
national versions of an FTT.8 On top of the FTT, there are various type of taxes levied on 
financial institutions.9 However, the financial transactions are notoriously exempt from 
Value-Added Taxation within the EU.10  
 
The Commission’s current proposal for an FTT was published in 2013, and the ten 
participating Member States are trying to come to an agreement on the contents of the 
proposal.11 This proposal has awaken a lot of different opinions for and against the FTT. 
Especially the issuance and residence principles introduced by the proposal have caused 
a lot of turmoil among non-participating Member States.12 Another thing that has divided 
the parties supporting and opposing the proposal, is the impact assessment made by the 
Commission. The Commission states in the impact assessment that the objectives of the 
FTT are firstly to harmonise existing regulation in the area of financial transaction taxes 
within the EU. The second objective is monitor the market and products more closely, 
thereby bringing more stability to the EU markets. The third objective is to make sure 
that the financial institutions contribute towards the common budget.13 The Commission 
states in the impact assessment that the FTT would be the right approach to achieve these 
objectives.14 However, several sources have stated that the impact assessment made by 
the Commission is overly optimistic and therefore is not the most reliable source.15 
 
                                                 
5 For the purpose of this thesis, securities are to be understood as shares, equities, bonds, and convertibles. 
6 James Tobin, ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’ (1978) 4/3-4 Eastern Economic Journal 
153, 153. 
7 Commission, ‘European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax’ COM (2013) 71 final, art 9(2). 
8 Levente Kovács, ‘Bank Taxes in the European Union’ (2012) LVII/3 Public Finance Quarterly 332, 337. 
9 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘Review of Current Practices for Taxation of Financial Instruments, Profits and 
Remuneration of the Financial Sector’ (2012) WP31 European Commission Taxation Papers, 6. 
10 ibid 30. 
11 Adrian Cloer and Stefan Trencsik, ‘Alive and Deadly – The European Financial Transaction Tax through 
Enhanced Cooperation: Current Progress’ (2014) 54/7 European Taxation 307, 307. 
12 ibid 310. 
13 Commission, ‘Implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax – Analysis of 
policy options and impacts’ SWD (2013) 28 final, 11. 
14 SWD (2013) 28 final, 50. 
15 Anita Millar, ‘A Financial Transaction Tax – Review of Impact Assessments’ (2012) Report prepared 




The proposal still has a lot of issues, and those parties opposing the proposal are saying 
that it will cause too many legal and other problems. Most significant of these problems 
are the extraterritorial effect, double taxation, and tax evasion. These legal problems are 
not technically against the EU Treaties,16 and the Commission has received the 
permission from the Council to use enhanced cooperation.17 Therefore, if the participating 
Member States come to an agreement, the non-participating countries do not have a lot 
they can do to prevent the implementation. 
 
These problems, especially the extraterritorial effect, are why certain countries, such as 
the UK, have been determinedly against the proposal. Understandably the FTT would 
affect significantly even the UK financial markets, even if the UK does not participate in 
the FTT, because of said extraterritorial effect.18 Therefore, with all the challenges the 
proposal is facing, it is interesting to see what will come of the FTT. The progress has 
been slow, but the participating Member States stated in December 2015 that they intend 
to have a decision by the end of June 2016.19 Considering how much this tax may affect 
even non-participating Member States, it is understandable why several interest groups 
are following closely what the outcome of that decision will be. Even more fascinating 
will be to see, what the actual impacts will be if the FTT is eventually implemented. 
However, the Commission seems to have a back-up plan if the FTT were to fail. The 
Commission has suggested that one method of executing this tax would be to implement 
a FTT with multinational agreements.20 
 
1.2 The Focus and the Scope of This Thesis 
 
The main research question of this thesis is: “What legal problems is the proposed 
Financial Transaction Tax facing?” The proposal is facing several legal problems, so to 
                                                 
16 Commission Legal Services Working Paper, ‘Legality of the “counter-party principle” laid down in 
Article 4(1)(f) of the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of FTT’ (March 2014) 1. 
17 Cloer and Trencsik (n 11) 307. 
18 Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘United Kingdom - The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation 
and the UK’s challenge’ (2013) 53/8 European Taxation 358, 364. 
19 Council, 'Outcome of the Council Meeting' (2015) 3435th Council meeting Economic and Financial 
Affairs Brussels, 4. 




narrow it down this thesis will mostly focus on the extraterritorial effect, tax evasion, and 
double taxation caused by the proposal. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer this question. Can this tax truly be something that 
will be genuinely permanent, or is this proposition just politically motivated and will be 
another one in a series of failed attempts to recuperate the European economy at the 
expense of causing new legal problems? To be able to answer this question, it is necessary 
to explore certain aspects about the proposition. Therefore in the second chapter it is 
important to describe the background of the proposition. This leads to the financial crisis 
in the EU, which frequently emerges as the driving force behind the FTT. 
 
Even though the crisis is a key element behind the FTT, it will not be the focus of this 
thesis. It is still vital to depict the basics of the financial crisis, to help understand why 
this proposition is considered necessary. Even though the proposition is not the only 
instrument that has been suggested to alleviate the negative impacts of the financial crisis, 
those other propositions and actions are not going to be illustrated extensively in this 
thesis. 
 
Moreover, to answer the research question, this thesis will introduce some other 
background information about current bank levies in Europe. Also, like previously 
mentioned, the FTT is not an original idea. Similar taxes have already been in place, and 
these models will be studied also. The main focus of this thesis is not to introduce these 
other models at length, but mostly to give the reader an idea, what other levies there are 
for banks these days, and to give also an insight into how this kind of tax has worked 
previously.  
 
After the background is illuminated, the final part of the second chapter will focus on 
answering what steps has there been for the proposition to get where it is currently. 
Usually many of the propositions made by the Commission are to some extent 
compromises of the original idea, and therefore it is interesting to recount not only, what 
the current proposition is, but how have we gotten where we are currently. This chapter 





After the background chapter, the thesis will examine in more detail, what the proposition 
will entail. In the third chapter the more technical aspects of the proposition will be 
examined more closely, and also what impacts the proposition is expected to have. In this 
chapter this thesis will also get into the legal problems that the proposal is facing, such as 
the extraterritorial effect and tax evasion, among other issues. 
  
The fourth chapter will study the proposition from various angles. In this chapter it is 
explained, why some parties are for and some are against the proposal. In said chapter the 
thesis will also investigate what the European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as 
the ECJ) has stated about the FTT. The most central case in this chapter is the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union C-
209/13 (30.4.2014). 
 
The fifth chapter will be dedicated to what is planned next for the FTT. What are the next 
phases and when the planned implementation would be? It will also study whether the 
FTT is meant to be permanent or only for until the EU market has recuperated from the 
crisis.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
 
When I started to approach the problem of which methods of study I should use while 
exploring the topic, I picked up a book ‘Minun metodini’ (My methods) by Häyhä, who 
is a doctor of laws, and a Supreme Court justice in Finland. In this book, Häyhä has 
worked together with other legal minds and edited said book combining different legal 
methodologies. 
 
In this book Aarnio has contemplated law as a science. According to him, law is 
ambiguous in a way. Law can be studied with several different methodologies, such as 
legal dogmatic, sociological legal method, comparative legal method, and historical legal 




is to discover the content of the provision, and also to organise the provisions within the 
legal order.21 
 
I also considered the historical legal method, since my research is, in a way, tied to an 
important turning point within the recent history of the European Union. Kekkonen stated 
in a chapter of the book authored by him, that when studying a significant legal change it 
is important to tie it to the current historical developments that happened at that time in 
the society. 22 So even though my research is very much tied to the current developments 
happening in the EU, it is not the main focus of my thesis. But nonetheless, it is important 
to depict these developments, for us to better understand the political climate and mind-
set of the lawmaker. 
 
So to conclude my assessment on which method I should use in this thesis, I came to the 
conclusion that the method of study to be used is legal dogmatic since I will mostly be 
focusing on the content of the proposal and the legal problems caused by it. Legal 
dogmatic is definitely the main method used in my thesis. However, on top of said method 
I will also be using some comparative analysis, because there will be some comparing of 
different financial transaction taxation systems in various countries, supplementing the 
main themes of this thesis. 
 
On top of these, because I will also consider what kind of legislative scheme could be 
effective to achieve the wanted outcome, the other method used is de lege ferenda. This 
is not the main method in this thesis as it will only be used in the final chapter of the 
thesis, where I will be drawing some of my own conclusions and assessing if a modified 
FTT or other type of tax would better achieve the sought outcome of the legislators. 
 
I also had to consider what kind of sources I would be able to use while writing this thesis. 
Since the FTT is a very recent development and a current subject in the EU, there are not 
that many books that I can use in my thesis as sources, but luckily there are a lot of recent 
articles published in various taxation, economic, and legal publications, written by some 
of the best experts in this field of taxation. 
                                                 
21 Aulis Aarnio, 'Oikeussäännösten Systematisointi Ja Tulkinta' in Juha Häyhä (ed), Minun 
metodini (Werner Söderström Lakitieto Oy 1997) 36-37. 
22 Jukka Kekkonen, ’Oikeudellisen muutoksen tutkimisesta – Minun metodini’ in Juha Häyhä (ed), Minun 




On top of those articles my most central source, especially in chapter three, will of course 
be the Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of financial transaction tax (also known as the COM(2013) 71). Also in this chapter, I 
will study the expected impacts of the FTT. The Commissions has made an impact 
assessment report, the SWD (2013) 28, which will be the most important impact 
assessment source in this thesis, even though I need to consider the source, when 































2.1 The Eurozone Crisis 
 
The latest financial crisis still affects almost everyone on a daily basis. The economy took 
a heavy hit during the financial crisis, and many of the Eurozone countries have still not 
recuperated from the aftermath. Everyday citizens can witness this for example with the 
still high unemployment rates,23 or simply by the fact that it is much more difficult to get 
a loan from the bank than it was prior to the crisis.24 This said, it feels like there are a lot 
of theories and opinions floating around as to what actually caused the crisis. Was it the 
fact that the EMU decided to endorse a single currency? Or was this a global crisis 
stemming from the US markets? Was this actually just something that was bound to 
happen, because, after all, economy is just one perpetually fluctuating organism? Is the 
correct answer all of the above? 
 
The reason why I get into the financial crisis in this chapter is that you cannot discuss the 
proposed FTT without understanding the financial crisis first. The justification for the 
FTT revolves very heavily around the financial crisis. The banking sector was at the core 
of the financial crisis and one of the main reasons for the FTT is that the financial 
institutions should carry their weight in restoring the economic system in Europe. Also 
some have argued that this is a way to punish the banking sector for causing the crisis 
with irresponsible and unsustainable practices. Some have even nicknamed the FTT as 
“the Robin Hood tax”.25 Trying to find the answer to the question of what ultimately 
caused the crisis, I have studied articles in an issue of the Journal of Macroeconomics 
focusing on the financial crisis, and I have focused on a few articles which I found the 
most interesting. 
  
One noteworthy point that Constâncio makes in his article about the causes of the 
financial crisis is whether a crisis could had been avoided in the EU if there had not been 
                                                 
23 Patrice Ollivaud and David Turner, ‘The effect of the global financial crisis on OECD potential output’ 
(2014) 1 OECD Journal: Economic Studies 41, 43. 
24 Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron, Gokhan Torna and Andrew Winton, ‘Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio 
Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis’ (2015) 70/6 The Journal of 
Finance 2451, 2483. 




a simultaneous international situation that threw the whole system off-balance. He 
wonders, whether the monetary union would had been enough for the euro area to 
gradually overcome its own vulnerabilities through a process of inter-regional 
rebalancing.26 This is an interesting point, but when the economy is so globally connected, 
the thought that this international situation would not have had an effect is irrelevant. I 
do not think it matters whether there was an international situation going on also, because 
the interconnectivity of the global markets, therefore eventually the European crisis could 
have also sparked the international crisis. In my opinion quite pointless to go over all of 
the “what ifs” when there is no way to actually know what would have happened, if this 
or that had not affected the situation. 
   
Although not everyone may agree with him, Constâncio does not believe that the 
Eurozone crisis was the result of the design of the EMU or the fact that certain Member 
States did not respect the Stability and Growth Pact before the crisis. As he points out, 
there was not a significant growth in government debt in the early years of the common 
currency in those countries most affected by the crisis. He shows that unlike the public 
debt, the private debt increased by 27% from the beginning of the common currency until 
2007. He also points out that there it makes no difference whether the Member State had 
followed the Stability and Growth pack prior to the crisis.27 He does admit though, that 
in certain cases the irresponsible fiscal policies did contribute to the economic 
imbalances.28 
 
One of the reasons why the private debt was able to increase so rapidly was that after the 
common currency was introduced cross-border transactions increased significantly. This 
means that the increased money flow made way for a massive credit boom in the countries 
which are now most affected by the crisis in the EU. When the money flow suddenly and 
unpredictably stopped, the banks found themselves struggling.29 What I find interesting 
in Constâncio’s theory is that he claims that the design of the EMU was not the cause of 
the crisis, yet he admits that the very reason why the private debt was able to escalate so 
quickly was the introduction of common currency. In my opinion it can be therefore 
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deduced that it was precisely the free flow of the common currency which ultimately lead 
to reckless lending and was one of the root causes of the crisis in the EU. 
 
The international financial crisis also affected the banks in the EU. According to 
Constâncio, European banks were affected by the international crisis in two major ways. 
Firstly, many European banks had invested heavily into the US housing market, and thus 
suffered substantial losses when the US housing market collapsed. Secondly, these banks 
that had invested into the US housing market, also took a heavy hit when the US subprime 
mortgage crisis occurred. The US subprime crisis was caused by irresponsible lending 
policies, in which they targeted the loans for people with low credit ratings. These people 
were eventually unable to make their payments and the mortgages defaulted. This meant 
that there was an influx of cheap houses on the market and thus the housing market 
suffered.30 
 
The conclusion that Constâncio arrives at, is that the original driver of the crisis was 
located in the financial sector. He summarizes:  
 
“The financial and macroeconomic imbalances built up by the activities of 
European banks until 2007, together with the international financial crisis, were 
the prime movers of crisis in Europe. Without this, the sovereign debt crisis would 
not have been nearly so severe.”31  
 
Although, as I previously mentioned, I do not agree with some parts of Constâncio’s 
theory, I agree with him on his conclusion. I also believe that the most plausible theories 
behind the Eurozone crisis are these two reasons he arrives at in his conclusion. 
 
Unlike Constâncio, Polito and Wickens also argue in their article that the Eurozone crisis 
was not due to the US subprime crisis, even if was the cause for financial crises in the 
US, the UK, and possibly even Germany and Switzerland.32 This stance that Polito and 
Wickens take is quite different from the one taken by Constâncio. I find this statement 
unconvincing, because as Constâncio previously stated in his article, the banks in the EU 
were heavily invested in the US housing market. Also, Polito and Wickens admit that the 
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subprime crisis affected the UK, and possibly Germany and Switzerland. The fact that 
these major economies in the Europe would have been the only ones affected is 
unrealistic, because if the crisis were to hit only the economies in these countries in 
Europe, it is quite improbable that the crisis would have been contained merely to these 
countries. 
 
Polito and Wickens argue that the crisis was already put into motion when a single 
currency was adopted. According to them, the crisis was inevitable when a single 
currency was set for several countries with different inflation rates. This meant that the 
countries with the highest inflation rates had exceedingly low official interest rates, which 
resulted in excessive borrowing which led to banking and debt crisis. This in turn caused 
loss of competitiveness compared with low inflation euro countries.33 In an article written 
by Sideris, he comes to the same conclusion as Polito and Wickens. Sideris also argues 
that the difference in real interest rates has been the cause of the euro crisis, even though 
he acknowledges that there are also other causes to the crisis.34 
 
It is difficult to avoid the fact when reflecting all aforementioned consequences the single 
currency caused, that maybe the single currency was not the best solution for the EMU. 
When reading about all that has happened in the Eurozone lately, it is difficult to come to 
any other conclusion except that the crisis was predetermined when the decision on a 
single currency was made. Not everyone may agree with this statement, however the facts 
are that the lending increased after the single currency was adopted, and that the 
difference in inflation rates caused loss of competitiveness. Perhaps it can be admitted 
that single currency is not directly the only cause for the crisis and that the issue is not as 
simple as I have put it, but maybe we were not properly prepared for the ramifications of 
the decision to adopt a single currency, and that is where it all went awry. 
 
Furthermore, Polito and Wickens state that monetary policy was too loose in the crisis 
countries.35 For once Constâncio also agrees with Polito and Wickens. He also 
acknowledges in his article that some countries did have negligent fiscal policies, which 
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contributed to economic imbalances.36 Especially Greece is the embodiment of such a 
country which practiced irresponsible fiscal policies in the years leading up to the crisis. 
To name a few of the mistakes made by the Greek government, they firstly had up to 2009 
significantly underestimated the national budget deficit, which in turn lead to a lack of 
confidence in the Greek government.37 Secondly the Greek government was short-sighted 
and was spending more money than the government could eventually afford.38 
 
In the book ‘The Eurozone Crisis – A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible 
Solutions’ the editors Baldwin and Giavazzi have collected a consensus view of the root 
causes of the crisis. They also come to the same conclusions as those previously 
introduced in this chapter. To sum up the main causes of the crisis here, to be the amount 
of debt borrowed from abroad and the sudden ceasing of money flow when the crisis hit. 
It also did not help that the money borrowed was invested unwisely and were not able to 
pay back the original investment. This eventually led to loss of competitiveness. Baldwin 
and Giavazzi also give some of the credit to irresponsible fiscal policies practiced by 
certain governments in the EU.39 The experts seem to be on the same page when it comes 
to which elements caused the crisis, but like to put different emphasis on the element that 
they seem to think had the most impact on the economy.  
 
2.2 The History of the Financial Transaction Tax 
2.2.1 Tobin Tax 
 
The FTT is modelled after a so called Tobin tax, therefore this chapter will firstly examine 
his suggested taxation model. The Tobin tax was introduced by a Nobel winning40 
economist and Professor James Tobin in 1978.41 He originally introduced the subject in 
1972 in his Janeway Lectures at Princeton. At this time his proposal was mostly 
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dismissed.42 He re-introduced the subject in the 1978 conference of the Eastern Economic 
Association in Washington D.C., and his address was the published in the Eastern 
Economic Journal.43 Tobin assessed that this time around the timing was more suitable 
for his proposal.44 
  
According to Tobin, in the 1970s, many economists had advocated floating exchange 
rates, determined by private markets without official intervention.45 Exchange rates can 
be fixed or floating. Fixed exchange rates mean that the exchange rate for the currency is 
tied to the value of gold. Therefore all the currencies’ values were fixed. This was the 
situation mostly until 1973, when the tie to gold was severed.  Floating exchange rates, 
also known as flexible exchange rates, means that since 1973 the major currencies were 
tied to the value of each other, instead of gold.46 Tobin remained sceptical about this 
development in the floating exchange rates, since according to him, it could not have been 
expected that governments could avoid all intervention in exchange markets. After this 
new system had been in place for a few years, it was soon discovered, that the flexible 
rates did not help eradicate international monetary problems, at least not to the extent as 
the most optimistic advocators had hoped. 47 
 
Tobin states that the basic problem was not fixed with this new exchange rate system, 
because the initial problem persisted. Tobin identifies this problem to be the excessive 
international or inter-currency mobility of private financial capital.48 According to Tobin, 
the speculation on exchange rates has concrete internal economic consequences. Tobin 
offers two solutions to this problem. The first solution involves introducing a worldwide 
common currency, common monetary and fiscal policy, and economic integration. The 
second proposal was to be later known more widely as the Tobin tax.49 
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Tobin proposed a globally uniform tax on all spot conversions of one currency into 
another.50 Spot conversions mean a single transaction from one currency into another at 
the set value, which is established at the time of the exchange.51 According to Tobin’s 
proposal, the tax would be proportional to the size of the transaction. He justified his 
proposal by stating that this tax would discourage short-term currency exchanges. He 
proposed that the tax should be a low percentage, and suggested as an example a 1% tax.52 
He also stated that the tax should be regulated by each government over its own 
jurisdiction. The country in question would be in charge of the taxation of all inter-
currency transactions going through the financial institutions in its jurisdiction.53 
 
Tobin suggested that his proposal for the tax would apply to all purchases of financial 
instruments denominated in another currency. This means that the tax applies to anything 
from currency to equity securities. Tobin justified this by stating that for the tax to be 
efficient, it has to apply to all payments in one currency sold by a resident of another 
currency area. On the other hand, he wanted to be careful about adding any barriers for 
trade. But on the other hand he sees that it would be easy to disguise transactions as trade. 
Tobin even suggested that some countries could form certain areas where this tax would 
not apply. This would help avoid any cumbrance to trade between smaller countries that 
have closely related economies dependent on this trade.54 
 
Even Tobin realised that one of the biggest issues with his proposal would be tax 
avoidance. He predicted that this tax would be difficult to administer and to enforce. He 
also predicted that it would be likely that there would be at least some imaginative evasion 
schemes, but that these would be costly to the evaders.55 Tobin was quite modest when it 
came to the effects of his proposal. He stated that the tax may restore some of the problems 
previously mentioned, that are caused by the short-term trading, but he also admitted that 
this tax could not be a general fix to most of said problems.56 
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It can be seen that the technical aspects of his proposal are very similar to the FTT. The 
details may be different, but it is clear that the inspiration for the FTT can be found in the 
Tobin tax. The proposed FTT is not the first tax modelled after the Tobin tax. There are 
currently several countries in Europe, who have some internal model of an FTT in use, 
for example such counties as United Kingdom and Switzerland.57 Although, some have 
pointed out that the Tobin tax is more of a currency transaction tax, and therefore should 
not be too closely associated with the proposed FTT.58 
 
2.2.2. Spahn Tax 
 
Since the introduction of the Tobin tax, there have been many variations of this tax.59 One 
of these variants was introduced by Paul Bernd Spahn.60 In his paper, Spahn considers 
Tobin’s proposed tax and finds certain difficulties in actually implementing this taxation 
model. He first claims that it is impossible to differentiate between normal liquidity 
trading and speculative noise trading. Thus the taxation of both could potentially be 
detrimental to the financial markets without actually deterring speculation, especially 
when the markets are in a period of distress.61 
 
Spahn argues that the second problem with the Tobin tax is that it discriminates against 
different types of financial instruments. Spahn explains that it would put certain 
instruments at a disadvantage if they are taxed equally, when the actual payoffs 
differentiate between instruments. Thirdly, Spahn has pointed out that if there was a 
different tax rate for all these types of financial instruments, it would result in an 
administrative nightmare and it would be very cumbersome to implement.62 It does need 
to be taken into consideration that during the time Spahn argued his theory, computers 
were not as common as they are nowadays. Therefore his argument about it being 
cumbersome is no longer as considerable an obstacle as it was in the nineties. 
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Spahn has offered his own solution to modify Tobin’s proposed tax. He suggests a two-
tier rate structure. In his proposal, the tax rate would be extremely low for normal 
operations and high for speculative trading during periods when the trading is erratic and 
the price point fluctuates outside of the regular exchange rate spectrum.63 Spahn 
suggested that a tax rate of 0.02% would raise significant tax revenues, but would not 
affect the markets considerably.64 
 
It is interesting to note that Spahn mocks the introduction of flexible exchange rates in 
the 70’s, which at that time was considered to be a good method of encouraging 
investment and durable economic growth.65 According to Spahn, it was “hailed by 
economists as a panacea to the ills of the Bretton Woods system”.66 What I find 
noteworthy here, is that even the economic experts seem to fixate on a certain solution to 
a problem, which when looked back on, is thought of as an unwise idea. It almost feels 
like all these kind of taxes that are proposed are mostly just on a trial and error basis. It is 
understandably hard to not know what impacts a proposed tax will have, but what I find 
the most significant here, is that these experts are so set in their opinions that they rarely 
like to admit that their proposal could turn out to be faulty in the end. 
 
In 2004 Belgium drafted a law that was modelled after the Spahn tax.67 The law imposes 
a tax on all exchange transactions involving foreign exchange that take place in 
Belgium.68 The draft law would be very similar to Spahn’s proposal. The draft law 
consists of a similar two-tier system, where the tax rate is 0.02% for foreign exchange 
transactions. The tax rate would be up to 80% for those transactions made at the price 
point that is outside the normal range of the spectrum. According to the draft law, the tax 
would only be implemented once all Member States of the EMU enact a similar tax 
scheme in their respective countries, or if EU legislation on this matter is adopted.69 When 
the Belgian Ministry of Finance asked for the opinion of the ECB on this draft law, the 
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ECB stated that they found this kind of draft law incompatible with the treaty, because it 
interferes with EU’s exclusive competence in the field of exchange-rate policy.70 
   
It is interesting to find that even prior to the financial crisis Belgium among other 
countries saw the need for a financial transaction tax, and such a tax has already been 
thought out in the seventies. So even though there is a lot of talk that the financial crisis 
was the starting point for concrete planning of a FTT, maybe the reality of situation is 
actually that the FTT was already an appealing idea prior to the crisis, but the crisis just 
enabled the planning to finally be taken seriously. 
 
2.3 Not Such an Original Idea after All - Previous Models of the FTT 
 
There are many countries that have opted to install a FTT and even the United States has 
their own version of the tax. There is a so called Section 31 fee in place in the United 
States, which is a Securities Transaction Tax (hereinafter referred to as the STT). This tax 
is collected on the majority of stock transactions. This tax was established already with 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the income collected with the STT is used to 
cover the operating costs of the Securities and Exchange Commission (also known as the 
SEC) in the United States.71 However, a few countries have never had a levy on securities 
transactions. Most well-known examples of these non-FTT counties are Germany and 
Japan. But in this chapter I review a few countries that have an internal FTT in place. 
These countries are the United Kingdom, Switzerland and China. There is no reliable data 
on previous experiences of cross-border FTT and therefore this kind of system cannot be 
assessed here.72 
 
In the United Kingdom the FTT was implemented almost 30 years ago.73 The UK model 
of the FTT has been considered to be one of the most successful ones. It has generated 
relatively minimal negative consequences for the local financial markets. The UK model 
is twofold; the financial transactions are subject to a Stamp Duty or Stamp Duty Reserve 
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Tax (hereinafter referred to as SDRT). To sum up, the Stamp Duty is a tax on transactions 
involving shares, securities, bearer instruments and the transfer of partnerships. The 
difference between the Stamp Duty and the SDRT is that Stamp Duty is charged on paper 
transactions and SDRT is charged on electronic transactions.74  
 
The point of the FTT is to be only a marginal percentage of the transfer price, and even 
the Stamp Duty and the SDRT fit this description. The percentage charged from the value 
of the transferred share is 0.5%. There is an exception to this percentage. When a share is 
transferred to a depositary receipt scheme or a clearance service the tax rate is 1.5%. The 
Stamp Duty is applied when the share is transferred in UK incorporated companies. It is 
irrelevant where the trade takes place or where the acquirer of the share resides. The tax’s 
applicability is related only to the incorporation country of the company; therefore the tax 
is not charged on securities issued by companies incorporated overseas.75 
 
One of the reasons why this UK model has had very minimal negative effects is that the 
tax is mostly easily collected through the electronic transaction system of the London 
Stock Exchange. This means that the administrative costs of the tax are marginal. The tax 
has also been very profitable for the UK. The duty amounted to approximately 4 billion 
euros in the fiscal period 2008/2009. Regardless of these positive effects, not all involved 
have been pleased with the Stamp Duty. The duty has caused substantial criticism, 
especially from the participants of the financial sector. These participants claim that the 
Stamp Duty and the SDRT have a negative effect on market liquidity and additionally 
reduces the price of stocks and bonds.76 
 
The other example country I use here is Switzerland, which unlike the UK, is a non-EU 
country. The Swiss FTT system is slightly more complex than the UK version. According 
to the Swiss Federal Stamp Tax Act, when a party to the transaction is a Swiss securities 
dealer, a stamp tax is imposed on transfer of domestic and foreign securities. According 
to the Act there are several exceptions, where it is irrelevant to the tax whether the issuer 
is incorporated domestically or abroad. For example when these securities are bonds or 
shares in investment funds et cetera. The Stamp Tax rate is 0.15% for domestic securities 
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and 0.3% for foreign securities. The tax is determined on the value of the transaction. 
There are numerous exemptions to the Swiss transfer tax, but even so, it managed to 
generate revenue of 2.95 billion Swiss Francs in 2008. This is a significant sum, since it 
amounted to 0.37% of the Swiss GDP.77 
 
The final example of a current financial transfer tax is the Chinese model. China is an 
Asian economic giant and obviously a non-EU country as well. There has been a 
transaction tax in place in China since 1990. The transaction tax is levied on securities 
trading. There are some exemptions to the Chinese Stamp Duty, such as bonds, options 
futures and other derivatives. The payable rate is 0.1% for all securities, except for loan 
contracts, where the rate is 0.005%. What this essentially means is that the tax can be 
easily avoided by using these tax free products, such as bonds or derivatives, instead of 
other taxable securities.78 
 
It is interesting to note that the Chinese system of shares is very unusual compared to 
other countries. In China the shares are divided into two categories. There are A-shares, 
which used to be denominated in Chinese currency and were mostly traded by Chinese 
citizens. The B-shares were denominated in US dollars or Hong Kong dollars, and were 
traded by foreign investors. This changed in 2001, when Chinese citizens were allowed 
to trade with B-shares, and in 2003 the foreign investors were allowed to trade with A-
shares.79 
 
The tax rate imposed on securities has fluctuated slightly in the past two decades, but is 
has always been between 0.1% and 0.5%. These fluctuations have impacted the trading 
volume in China so that the trading volume has been inversely proportional to whether 
the tax rate was increased or decreased. This means that when the rate was increased, the 
trading volume has decreased, and other way around. What is most interesting to note 
about these fluctuations is that disregarding whether the tax rate has increased or 
decreased, the volatility of the market has always increased after the tax rate has been 
changed.80 It is fascinating to observe that the reactions the markets have to a tax are 
sometimes very surprising. 
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It is difficult to compare or rank which of these three taxation systems has functioned the 
most successfully. All of these systems seem to work for the country in which they are in 
place. Switzerland, China, and the UK all have somewhat different markets and trading 
cultures and therefore what might work for one country, may end up being a failure in 
another. It is also impossible to state, which of these systems is objectively the best, even 
though the UK Stamp Duty has the most impressive track record. The UK Stamp Duty 
has worked well for almost three decades. This bodes well for the proposed EU FTT. On 
the other hand adding a cross border FTT for the EU might affect negatively to these 
countries which already have a domestic FTT and have this additional burden for 
transactions. One of the reasons why these domestic FTT systems have worked in these 
countries might be that these taxes are only applied to transactions made in a single, 
domestic market. These are significantly easier to regulate and implement than on an 
international level. Additionally, adding an international transaction tax on top of these 
domestic taxes may result in double taxation.  
 
2.4 Current Taxation of the Financial Sector in the EU 
 
The Financial sector is taxed by either corporate taxation of the financial sector, the value-
added taxation of the financial sector, or by taxation of the financial instruments. When 
it comes to the corporate income tax (hereinafter referred to as CIT) rate, the banks in the 
EU countries pay the same tax rate as other companies.81 There is no separate tax rate 
specifically for banks compared to other types of companies.82 Also, none of the banks 
registered in an EU Member State have specific tax relief rules, such as paying less taxes 
or being able to make tax deductions on certain types of income received by banks 
compared to income received by different types of companies.83 Therefore it can be 
concluded that when it comes to CIT, banks are not treated differently than dissimilar 
companies in other sectors.84 
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According to an EU directive85 the financial sector in the EU is entirely Value-Added 
Taxation (hereinafter referred to as VAT) exempt.86 This is uncommon and the financial 
sector in the EU is only one of the few sectors that are exempt from paying VAT. 
Especially after the severe effects caused by the financial crisis, there has been a demand 
for adding a new taxation scheme for the financial sector in lieu of VAT. Currently the 
financial sector is heavily under-taxed and the politicians in the EU are pressured to make 
the financial sector participate in contributing towards the common budget.87  
 
However, the aforementioned VAT Directive does give the Member States the option to 
permit taxable individuals a right to choose taxation of exempt financial transactions.88 
But even though this is an option offered to all Member States, only seven89 have opted 
to implement it.90 There are other taxes on financial transactions in place in several 
Member States to help compensate for the VAT-exemption. Only six Member States91 do 
not have any other taxes on financial services in place.92 These other taxes and levies 
which certain Member States have implemented are to name a few as an example stamp 
duties, bank levies, stock exchange taxes, etc. This in mind, it is important to note that 
the content of these taxes may vary significantly between Member States.93 
 
Because the process of adding an EU-wide FTT has been lengthy, many Member States 
have opted to impose their own bank taxes. Already 17 Member States have ended with 
varying types of taxes for the financial sector. There are three basic types of taxes 
introduced in these countries. The most widespread tax (used in 15 Member states) is 
based on specific balance sheet items. The other two types of taxes used are FTT- and 
FAT-type taxes.94 Financial Activities Tax (hereinafter referred to as the FAT), which is 
a tax on sum of profits and remuneration of financial institutions. Here it differs from the 
FTT. FAT is basically the tax on net transactions of financial institutions, while an FTT 
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taxes gross transactions.95 However, since these taxes are not mutually exclusive, some 
member states even use a mix of these types of taxes. For example Hungary and United 
Kingdom uses two types of these taxes, while France uses three different models.96 
 
The final type of tax on the financial sector which is studied here is the taxation of 
financial instruments. Securities and derivatives are the financial instruments in question. 
Equities, bonds and convertibles are classified as securities.97 These are also the 
instruments that will be taxed if the proposed FTT comes into force. Securities are taxed 
when a transaction from one owner to another takes place. This type of taxation of 
securities transaction is a so called indirect tax, because it is not a direct result of income. 
Therefore securities transfer taxation needs to be kept separate from different types of 
securities taxation situations, such as income tax, registration tax or capital duties.98 
 
As opposed to securities, certain derivatives are taxed directly. These types of derivatives 
in question here are equity swaps, financial futures and call options on stocks. The method 
of taxation of derivatives differs a lot between Member States. This is not merely because 
of the difference in legislation, but also because the types of derivatives can vary 
significantly making this a considerably more of a complex system.99 To make matters 
even more complex, some countries treat identical types of derivatives in a different way, 
depending on several factors, such as if the derivative is listed, or if the transactions are 
speculative.100 
 
Examining these taxes it is very obvious that even though the current taxation 
arrangement of the economic sector is a pretty complex system, it is extremely 
advantageous for the financial players. The financial sector has somehow managed to 
hold on to its VAT-exempt position for surprisingly long. However, it remains to be seen 
whether or not it is a good idea to add the proposed EU-wide FTT, or if there actually 
was a solid reason for this tax break on the financial sector. Possibly to make the EU 
market more attractive place of business to financial institutions, it was necessary to give 
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this sector these tax breaks. It is always difficult to legislate in the financial sector when 
the lawmaker has to take into considerations the possibility of relocation of companies or 
marketplaces when there are more advantageous tax schemes globally available 
elsewhere. 
 
2.5 Development of the FTT 
 
When the global economy was deep in the financial crisis, the issue of imposing a tax for 
financial transactions was raised at the 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit. The G-20 leaders 
asked the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as IMF) to research how 
the financial sector could contribute more into the recovery from the crisis, especially 
considering how significant role the financial sector played in causing the crisis.101 In 
preparation for the G-20 Toronto Summit, European Council gave the following 
statement on 17 June 2010: 
 
‘The EU should lead efforts to set a global approach for introducing 
systems for levies and taxes on financial institutions with a view to 
maintaining a world-wide level playing field and will strongly defend this 
position with its G-20 partners. The introduction of a global financial 
transaction tax should be explored and developed further in that 
context.’102 
 
This was the first concrete step towards the planning of the FTT. As previously 
mentioned, the biggest driving force behind the FTT was the financial crisis. The Council 
recognised the need for a more stable economy in the EU. On top of this, other reasoning’s 
behind the FTT were budgetary needs for several upcoming developments regarding for 
example climate change and resource efficiency. The council perceived the FTT as a 
means to generate revenue to cover these future needs.103 In the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the 2011 proposal, the Commission has also stated that the tax income 
created from the FTT would help ease the strain of the contributions made by single 
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Member States towards the EU budget.104 The Commission also stated that according to 
preliminary estimates, the revenues generated by the proposed FTT would be 57 billion 
euros per year in the whole EU.105 
 
After these developments, when it came time for the G-20 summit of 2011 in Cannes to 
meet, the wheels were set in motion and sides had been picked. It had become ever more 
apparent that launching a global FTT model was unrealistic at this time, because the idea 
of a global financial transaction tax had not gained enough popularity. Considering how 
much the EU FTT has divided the nations, it is difficult to take seriously the idea of a 
world-wide FTT. On a global scale the EU is such a small amount of nations, and even 
on this scale realising the FTT has proven highly problematic. Regardless of the failure 
of the global tax, the FTT in Europe had influential supporters in major EU Member 
States, such as France and Germany. On the other side of the trenches opposing the idea 
were UK and Sweden. Eventually on 28th of September 2011 the Commission issued its 
first proposal on the FTT.106  
 
The Commission’s proposal in 2011 was quite drastic and caused a lot of uproar among 
the EU Member States.107 With this proposal the Commission wanted to achieve several 
objectives. One of the biggest objectives of this proposal was to create a unified system 
for the EU, which would help also solve the problem of risky behaviour plaguing 
specifically certain financial sectors. Creating such a unified system would help prevent 
the fragmentation of the regulation regarding the financial sector, especially considering 
how currently many Member States have already implemented their own taxation for the 
financial sector.108 
  
Another objective is to deter harmful speculative trading. Speculative trading is analysing 
market risks and investing in higher risk products for greater profit. Speculative trading 
can be also done by using the method of high frequency trading, which means that the 
investment is bought and sold at quick intervals, only holding the investment for as little 
as seconds. To accomplish high frequency trading, complex computer programs are 
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required. Since the high frequency trading has usually small profit margins the proposed 
FTT would make this method much more unappealing to investors, since it would cut 
into those small profit margins making this method unprofitable.109 
 
According to the 2011 proposal the FTT is applied when at least one party to the 
transaction is established in a participating Member State.110 It is insignificant where the 
transaction takes place, the transaction is taxed based on where the financial actors are 
established. This is also known as the residence principle.111 The proposal also stated 
several exemptions to the scope of the directive, for example the directive will not apply 
to primary market transactions,112 and therefore initial issuance of shares, bonds and 
government bonds are exempt from the FTT.113 The proposed FTT will be applicable 
only between financial institutions, but again there are certain exceptions to this, for 
example transactions between central banks or similar entities will not be subject to the 
FTT.114 
 
The 2011 proposal set minimum tax rates for Member States depending on the type of 
the financial instrument. The proposal stated that the tax rate should not be lower than 
0.01% for derivatives, and 0.1% for other financial instruments, such as shares and 
bonds.115 Therefore this means that the Commission has left the decision of the final tax 
rate up to the individual Member States. Considering the fact that one of the key 
objectives of the proposal was to create a unified system, I find it rather illogical that the 
proposal leaves such an important item as the tax rate up to the individual Member States. 
 
According to the Commission, the 2011 proposal has its legal basis on the Article 113 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the 
TFEU).116 According to the Article 113 of the TFEU: 
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 “The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee, adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation 
concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to 
the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition.” 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that this proposal has legal basis does not mean that the proposal is 
compatible with EU law. Also, as can be seen from this Article 113, it requires that the 
Council needs to be unanimous. However, this was not the case. In January of 2012 the 
Prime Minister of United Kingdom, David Cameron, publicly stated that they will veto 
the proposed FTT.117 Many of the Member States were sceptical of the 2011 proposal and 
eventually the ECOFIN Council came to the conclusion that reaching unanimity was not 
realistic.118  
 
On 23 October 2012, the Commission decided to ask the Council to approve the use of 
enhanced cooperation, which was supported by 11 Member States.119 They received the 
approval of the Parliament on 12 December 2012, and eventually the Council gave the 
permission to use enhanced cooperation on 22 January 2013.120  This was the first time 
ever that a limited number of Member States received the permission to use enhanced 
cooperation to create a common system for taxation.121 Finally, after these dramatic turns, 
the Commission submitted its most recent proposal for the FTT on 14 February 2013.122 
This is the current proposition and it will be analysed more comprehensively in Chapter 
3 of this thesis. 
 
Enhanced cooperation is a legal instrument originally introduced in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, when it was still called ‘closer cooperation’.123 The current rules for using 
enhanced cooperation can be found in Article 20 of the Treaty on the European Union 
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(hereinafter referred as the TEU) and Article 329 the TFEU. Minimum of nine Member 
States are required to make the request of enhanced cooperation to the Commission, 
which in turn assesses the request and submits the request to the Council, if it deems it 
justified. The Council has the authority to then approve or reject the request, after the 
Parliament has given its consent to the enhanced cooperation.124 This procedure of 
enhanced cooperation makes it easier for some countries to work together on a specific 
project without needing the unanimity of all of the Member States to reach a certain 
objective.125 
 
Originally the 2011 proposal was supposed to enter into force in 1 January 2014, but this 
deadline was not reached. Several problems got in the way of reaching this goal, for 
example the aforementioned lack of unanimity which hindered the process. Furthermore, 
on top of the lack of unanimity, there were several countries downright against the 
proposal. Countries such as United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg were worried for 
losing their financial position.126 United Kingdom even filed a lawsuit with the ECJ to 
oppose the use of enhanced cooperation here.127 This lawsuit will be closer examined in 
Chapter 4. 
 
The current proposal was supposed to enter into force on 1 January 2016, but this deadline 
has already passed.128 The talks between these countries have been dragging on since 
2011. The latest news of developments came from the statement given by the Council on 
Economic and Financial Affairs after a meeting in Brussels on 8 December 2015. 
According to the statement Estonia had left the group of countries participating in the 
enhanced cooperation.129 The statement also said that a decision about the current 
proposal will be reached by the end of June 2016.130 
 
Consequently it is undeniable that the development of the proposal for the FTT has not 
been straightforward and easy. It has understandably faced many issues, especially with 
reaching consensus among participating countries concerning the content of the proposal. 
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When trying to make such an EU-wide tax a reality, it can be expected that there will be 
some opposition and problems. However, I cannot help but lose faith in the proposal after 
reading all it has been through and how much the development is still stalling. It seems 
like the proposal has been through so many negotiations and there have been so many 
compromises, that perhaps the original objectives of the proposal can no longer be 
reached with the watered down compromise proposal. However, all this remains still to 
be seen. 
 
2.6 Other Regulatory Proposals for the Financial Sector 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2011 proposal, the Commission has stated that 
The EU is currently in the middle of a massive renovation project aiming to reform many 
of the regulation concerning the financial sector. The Commission stated: 
 
“The EU financial services reform is oriented around four strategic objectives, 
namely improving the supervision of the financial sector; strengthening financial 
institutions, and providing a framework for their recovery where necessary; 
making financial markets safer and more transparent; and increasing the protection 
of consumers of financial services. It is expected that this wide-reaching reform 
will bring back the financial services sector at the service of the real economy, in 
particular to finance growth. The FTT proposal is intended to complement these 
regulatory reforms.”131 
 
As previously mentioned, most of the other regulatory measures have been implemented 
on a Member State level. Although the main theme in this chapter is the other proposals 
relating to the taxation of the financial sector, it is worth mentioning that on top of these, 
there were also other non-tax related proposals which aimed to alleviate the effects of the 
financial crisis. These are for example the Directive on Alternative Fund Managers, which 
affects hedge funds. As another example there was also the implementation of the 
European Systemic Risk Board and the European System Financial Supervisors, which 
both aim to make the financial markets stronger and more stable.132 
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There has been a lot of discussion in the European Union, whether the financial sector is 
under-taxed. One of the reasons for this allegation is that the financial sector is exempt 
from Value-Added Taxation. Especially recently there has been an eagerness to fill this 
void of VAT-free state has produced. On top of the FTT, another type of tax was 
considered by the Commission in 2010. This was the Financial Activities Tax (FAT).133 
FAT is a tax on the amount of profit and remunerations of the financial sector. Therefore 
this tax would be a good substitute for the VAT.134 However, already in 2011, the 
Commission decided to drop their FAT proposal, and focus on the proposal for the FTT 
instead.135 The Commission has stated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2011 
proposal that after analysing the impact assessment of both the FTT and the FAT, they 
had found that the FTT would be the one more likely to help achieve the objectives of the 
tax.136 
 
Another suggestion presented by various sources, most notably the International 
Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as IMF), was the Financial Stability Contribution 
or Bank Levy. As previously mentioned, this type of tax has already been implemented 
by numerous countries. The reasoning behind this suggestion was that this model is 
supposed to reduce the risk of uninsured liabilities. On top of these suggestions, there are 
currently several regulatory proposals for the financial sector, which strive to accomplish 
a more stable and strong economic system. To name a few of such proposals for example 
are the Basel III (globally) and the Frank-Dodd Act (USA).137  There is obviously 
enthusiasm to firstly increase contribution of the financial sector for the costs of the crisis, 
and secondly to prevent the possibility of contagion of failing banks to other financial 
institutions.138 
 
As can be seen, the FTT is far from being the only active proposal in the financial sector 
currently. It seems like the Commission was sincere when it stated in the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the 2011 proposal that the EU is in the middle of reforming the 
regulation in the financial sector. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, these 
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reformations are not only limited to the EU. In my opinion these proposals are slow to 
implement, because firstly there is so much bureaucracy a proposal must go through 
before it can be implemented. It takes a long time to draft these proposals and an even 
longer time to reach a consensus with participating countries for the proposal eventually 
pass the legislation system. Secondly it is hard to draft these proposals, because there is 
so much current domestic and international legislation and ongoing proposals that needs 
to be taken into consideration, before the proposal can be drafted. These are just to name 
a few issues a proposal may be facing in the financial sector. It all seems so difficult that 
it is no wonder that it takes such a long time to get a new proposal in the financial sector 
to eventually pass. However, reformation is necessary and even though it may be a 























3. The Proposal - What Will It Change 
3.1 The Current Proposal 
 
The Commission proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax was published on 14 February 2013. The current proposal is quite similar 
to the original proposal as the participating Member States tried to make sure that it will 
meet the same objectives as those set out in the original proposal.139 As previously 
mentioned, the proposal was published after the participating countries were given the 
permission from the Council to use enhanced cooperation in this situation.140 Currently 
there are only ten Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation after Estonia 
left the group in December 2015. The countries still participating are Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The 
participating countries need to reach a unanimous agreement for the proposal to pass.141 
The negotiations are still ongoing on the content of the proposal and progress has been 
slow.  
 
It is worth noting that the UK is not among the participating countries, as it is actually 
quite adamantly against the proposal. The London Stock Exchange is one of the largest 
financial centres in the world and not having the UK participate in the FTT means 
significant decrease of revenues generated by the tax. Even now, when the UK is not 
among those participating, the Commission has estimated that the UK would one of the 
biggest contributors to the tax as a result of issuance and residence principles.142 However, 
there are other countries participating, who are important financial players in the financial 
markets, such as France and Germany. If none of these central financial countries in the 
EU were to participate in the FTT, and the proposal was lead by ten smaller countries, I 
do not believe that the FTT would ever become a reality, or even come as far as it has 
come today. 
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One of the important things to understand about the proposal is which type of transactions 
are intended to fall within the scope of the financial transaction tax. The scope of the tax 
only applies to specific financial transactions. There are already several different types of 
taxation systems in existence that may overlap with said scope. To name a few of these, 
there is for example the securities transaction tax, which is a tax on transactions of 
securities. There is also the tax on international currency market called the currency 
transaction tax. Finally there is a tax on deposits and withdrawals, which are called 
banking transactions, and therefore are taxed with the bank transaction tax.143 The 
Commission has in its proposal listed the financial instruments which will be taxed. These 
instruments are derivatives (at a tax rate of 0.1%) and other financial instruments, such 
as shares and bonds (at a tax rate of 0.1%).144 As in the 2011 proposal, the Commission 
has defined in the 2013 FTT that the financial transaction is taxed if at least one of the 
participating financial institutions is established in a participating Member State.145 
 
The new proposal brought some changes, mainly because the legislators now had to take 
into account that the geographical area of the participating countries is significantly 
smaller than originally intended when it was still thought to affect all of the 28 Member 
States. The essence of the proposal remained, but there were some minor and a few more 
important changes, such as the general anti-abuse rule, which was inserted to prevent 
artificial measures taken with the specific purpose of avoid having to pay the financial 
transaction tax. Furthermore, some public bodies were left out of the domain of the 
proposal.146 
 
Perhaps the most significant change that was added to the 2013 FTT was the issuance 
principle. What this principle means is that the financial instruments which have been 
issued in any of the participating Member States will be subject to the tax. This principle 
was added to the latest proposal to prevent tax evasion, because with this change the 
transaction will be taxed even if the financial institutions participating in the transaction 
are not established in the participating Member States. This increases the scope of the tax 
considerably. It is important to observe that the issuance principle is not meant to replace 
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the residence principle, but to act as an addition to the fundamental principle of 
residence.147 
 
Consequently, as was demonstrated above, the new proposal is not in essence 
significantly different from the original proposal. However, especially the issuance 
principle caused turmoil, because it was thought to be somewhat discriminating towards 
the countries which were not participating. The issuance principle would mean that if the 
financial institutions participating in the transaction were based in China and Canada, but 
the instrument had been issued in Germany, then the transaction would be subject to 
taxation. Some have argued that this has extraterritorial effect.148 Additionally, the 
issuance may cause tax evasion, because investors may be more inclined to favour those 
products, which will not be taxed under the issuance principle. This and other legal 
problems arisen from the proposal will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3.3 of this 
thesis. 
 
3.2 Estimated Impacts 
 
Accompanying the 2013 proposal, the Commission also published an impact assessment. 
The Commission stated that throughout its assessment it is crucial to keep in mind the 
objectives of the proposal. In the assessment the Commission maintained that the original 
objectives have not changed from the initial proposal. There are three main objectives, 
which are firstly to harmonise current legislation regarding financial transaction taxes 
within the EU. The second objective is to prevent unwanted market behaviour and to 
provide stability to the EU markets. The Commission states that the third objective is to 
ensure fair and substantial contribution of financial institutions to the costs of the recent 
financial crisis.149 
 
The Commission had already published an impact assessment in 2011 with the original 
proposal, but considering that the new proposal covered a much smaller geographical area 
and there were changes made to the original proposal, drafting a new impact assessment 
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was necessary. In the new impact assessment, the Commission first limited which areas 
deserved the most attention when they began assessing the impacts. The Commission 
stated that one of the biggest issues was especially the narrower FTT jurisdiction, and 
whether it would trigger unwelcome single-market effects, for example double taxation. 
Secondly, the Commission appreciated that adverse market reactions, such as the 
possibility of relocation, needed to be studied. Thirdly, the revenue for the smaller 
jurisdiction needed to be calculated.150 
 
When it comes to the first issue of unwelcome single-market effects, the Commission 
states that double taxation cannot be avoided if all EU Member states are not participating 
in the proposal.151 On a more positive note, the participating countries should be able to 
avoid double taxation within the FTT jurisdiction. The Commission assesses that these 
potential instances of double taxation should only comprise of a tiny proportion of all 
transactions, and it suggests that there are a few solutions to correct this problem after the 
implementation of the FTT. The first, and more preferable solution according to the 
Commission, would be that those Member States unwilling to currently join the 
participating Member States were to later on join the FTT-zone. The second solution 
would be a bilateral double-taxation agreements between participating and non-
participating countries.152 
 
The proposition may cause several adverse market reactions, such as relocation. 
Relocation can be accomplished by either moving activities to a location not within the 
FTT jurisdiction, or moving to different products or business models which are not 
subject to the FTT, or by discontinuing the taxable activity. The commission claims in its 
assessment that it would be challenging and near impossible to geographically locate to 
a different location that would not be taxed, unless the financial institution is prepared to 
cease transactions or desert clients in the FTT jurisdiction.153 Therefore the Commission 
comes to the conclusion that the risk of geographical relocation is minimal.154 When it 
comes to the substitution of products or changing a business model, the Commission 
considers the FTT to have some effect, for example when it comes to low-margin 
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transactions such as high frequency trading. The tax may end up decreasing these types 
of transactions.155 
 
The Commission re-estimated the revenues generated by the FTT due to the fact that the 
originally planned geographical jurisdiction of the FTT-zone has decreased significantly. 
According to the original impact estimation of 2011 the tax was estimated to bring 57 
billion euros annually in the EU. This was divided to 19.4 billion generated from the 
taxation of transactions in securities, while 37.7 billion would have been generated from 
the taxation of derivatives.156 The current revenue estimations are calculated when there 
were still eleven participating Member States, and therefore is no longer accurate.157 
According to the current estimation the total revenues of 34 billion euros, where 13 billion 
is generated from the taxation of transactions in securities, while 21 billion will be 
generated from the taxation of derivatives.158 
 
The Commission stated in the impact assessment concerning the objectives of the 
proposal, that none of these objectives can be met without some involvement from the 
EU legislators. Therefore the Commission comes to the conclusion that this taxation on 
an EU level is required to achieve its objectives. Although the Commission would 
consider the EU wide tax to be a more advantageous model, it believes that even with the 
current model those objectives can be met, even though there may be more adverse effects 
compared to the original proposal.159 
 
I may be either cynical or otherwise mistrusting, but nonetheless I find some of the things 
stated by the Commission in the impact assessment hard to believe. I cannot help but 
wonder whether their impact assessment is either biased or overly optimistic. There are 
definitely certain parties in the EU which would benefit from the FTT. A lot of 
governments in the EU would benefit greatly from the added income generated by this 
tax. For example, Greek economy is still heavily affected by the latest crisis. The revenue 
from the FTT would benefit the Greek government directly, as the country is still in dire 
need of capital and the economy is high. Additionally, considering the fact that there is 
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so much opposition of the proposal, it may be that the participating countries are tempted 
to make the impact assessment look more appealing. The Commission may not be 
falsifying the results of the impact study, but instead are using the more positive end of 
the spectrum of estimation. I especially noticed that for example the problem concerning 
the double taxation, the Commission merely dismisses it with the solutions being that the 
rest of the EU Member States should join the FTT, or they should all make bilateral 
double-taxation agreements. Both of these solutions seem quite extreme to me, and 
therefore the issue of double taxation is more real than the Commission maybe would like 
to admit. 
 
Furthermore, upon additional research I found that there have been several experts who 
have criticised the Commission’s impact assessment. There have been a lot of analyses 
and independent impact assessments, and various sources have come to the conclusion 
that the Commission’s impact assessment is not reliable.160 As an example, the 
Commission claims there to be positive correlation between the trading volume and price 
volatility. The issue with this statement is that while there are some studies, which have 
aimed to prove this, there is no actual empirical evidence or economic theory that could 
back this statement.161 Therefore I would recommend reading the impact assessment 
critically. 
 
3.3 Legal Problems Facing the Proposal 
  
As I previously mentioned, the Commission has stated that the legal basis for the proposal 
is the Article 113 TFEU. This article gives the Council the right to adopt provisions for 
the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms 
of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of 
competition.162 Soone wrote an article for the journal Intertax claiming that said legal 
basis of the proposal should be questioned. According to him there are a few issues when 
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basing the proposal on this article. There are four requirements that need to be met when 
relying on Article 113 TFEU. According to Soone these four requirements are that firstly 
the proposal needs to ensure harmonisation, can only affect the field of indirect taxation, 
has to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market, and avoid 
distortion of competition.163  
 
According to Soone, the proposal needs to ensure harmonisation. Considering that the 
proposal was brought forth with the enhanced cooperation, it somewhat goes against the 
idea of EU wide harmonisation. However, the proposal would harmonise existing 
legislation in the participating Member States. Soone states in his article that the problem 
with this is the fact that not all participating Member States have imposed a domestic 
financial transaction tax, but another type of tax only resembling a financial transaction 
tax. These taxes resemble more closely a levy or a state fee, and therefore would not be 
covered by this harmonisation.164 This is something I find the Commission should not 
overlook. Considering the fact that these kind of different domestic taxes imposed on 
financial transactions could end up burdening the financial institutions in some countries 
excessively and be too much of an unjust solution to some counties’ financial institutions, 
cutting too deep into the revenues of the entities. Moreover, it would be quite unfair that 
in some FTT-zone countries there would only be the zone-wide FTT, which would 
replace these domestic financial transaction taxes, while in other FTT-zone countries the 
FTT would be added on top of the domestic tax burden. This would put these two 
countries’ financial institutions at an unequal balance and therefore cause distortion of 
competition. In my opinion, the participating Member States must discuss and consider, 
which domestic taxes should be replaced by the proposed FTT. 
 
Furthermore, Soone points out that the proposal can only affect the field of indirect 
taxation. According to him, a tax is indirect when it is created by the consumers 
consuming goods or services. He claims that because this tax will be imposed on financial 
institutions and not created by consumers, therefore this tax is not an indirect tax.165  
Soone also states that the proposal must avoid distortion of competition. According to 
him, the mere fact that this tax would be implemented only in participating Member States 
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already distorts competition, because non-participating Member States would thereby end 
up having a more appealing tax environment.166 
 
I admit that Soone does convey some valid opinions, but on certain issues I feel that his 
arguments are somewhat farfetched, especially when it comes to whether FTT is an 
indirect tax or not. The issue of the legal basis of the FTT has caused a lot of debate 
among tax lawyers, yet the Commission remains adamant that the legal basis derived 
from the Article 113 TFEU under enhanced cooperation is solid. However, the fact that 
the proposal has legal basis in a TFEU Article does not signify that the proposal is 
compatible with EU legislation. This is where the proposal has faced its biggest challenge. 
There are several aspects about the proposal which have been challenged by those parties 
opposing the proposal. The opponents have been questioning the numerous legal 
problems that have arisen. The most noteworthy legal problems facing the proposal are 
double taxation, extraterritorial effect, and tax evasion.  
 
3.3.1 Extraterritorial Effect 
 
Extraterritorial effect means that when a country has its own sovereignty, no other country 
or international entity can establish legislation within that country’s domestic jurisdiction 
that will infringe a country’s sovereignty without the consent of said country.167 Therefore 
the EU should not be able to draft any legislation that will affect Member States, without 
their consent. The Member States have given the EU a mandate to legislate on certain 
issues when they joined the Union, but even those regulations should not go too much to 
the core of the countries’ sovereignty.168 This is why especially the residence and issuance 
principles have caused an outburst of objections among opposing parties of the proposal, 
because these principles are argued to have extraterritorial effect. 
 
                                                 
166 ibid 46. 
167 Robert Dover and Justin Frosini, The extraterritorial effects of legislation and policies in the EU and 
US (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2012), 7. 





The EU is not the only jurisdiction where extraterritorial effect has manifested. Another 
great example is the Alien Tort Statute in the United States, which was implemented 
already in 1789. According to the Statute: 
  
“District courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”169 
 
Therefore any foreign citizen may bring a claim to a US court, even if the claim is not 
based on US law. It is also possible even when the violation did not take place within the 
geographical jurisdiction of the US.170 This type of jurisdiction the US has given itself 
undeniably causes extraterritorial effect, because by implementing this Statute, the US 
has legislated on a matter that involves the international jurisdiction of tort cases. 
 
According to the residency principle any financial transactions outside of the FTT-zone 
would be subject to taxation if either of the financial institutions participating in the 
transaction is considered to be established in any of the participating Member States. 
Furthermore, according to the issuance principle, a financial transaction is taxed if the 
financial instruments have been issued in any of the participating Member States. These 
two principles are the cause why the FTT proposal agreed upon by the participating 
Member States will undeniably also affect non-participating Member States.171 The 
Commission has stated that these principles were added to prevent tax avoidance, but 
considering how much this may end up affecting non-participating Member States, it is 
impossible not to wonder, whether this was added as a tool to add incentive for those 
countries to eventually join the FTT zone. The current proposal would levy taxes on the 
financial institutions in non-participating countries, without generating revenues for said 
countries, and therefore eventually it may seem more logical for said countries to just 
give in and join the FTT-zone. 
 
The EU Council legal services (hereinafter referred to as the CLS) issued a legal opinion 
on the legality of the counterparty-based deemed establishment of financial institutions. 
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The legal opinion sought to answer especially whether the residency principle (Article 
4(1)(f) of the FTT proposal) was compatible with Article 327 TFEU172, which states: 
 
“Any enhanced cooperation shall respect the competences, rights and obligations 
of those Member States which do not participate in it. Those Member States shall 
not impede its implementation by the participating Member States.”173 
 
The CLS came to the conclusion that the residence principle would have extraterritorial 
effect, since the directive adopted under enhanced cooperation would enter the 
jurisdiction of those countries not in the FTT-zone.174 The CLS also considers whether 
the violation can be justified by the objectives of the proposed FTT, which are to raise 
revenue, make financial sector contribute to the costs of the crisis, and discourage risky 
activities in the financial sector. To the first objective, the CLS merely states that raising 
revenue is obviously not sufficient justification. Secondly the CLS states that the majority 
of the financial institutions that would be subject to the FTT had no part in causing the 
financial crisis, therefore it would be unacceptable as a justification. Thirdly the CLS 
notes that even though the objective of the FTT is to reduce risky activities, the 
discouraging effect would also affect activities with authentic economic value, and 
regardless, the CLS finds that the third objective is not a valid justification for the 
extraterritorial effect caused.175 
 
The CLS also considers whether the extraterritorial effect caused by the issuance principle 
can be justified by the fact that this provision was added to the proposal to help inhibit 
tax evasion and fraud. The provision is meant to prevent migration of financial 
transactions to non-participating Member States, which without the provision would 
become relatively effortless. The CLS came to the conclusion that such an anti-fraud and 
anti-evasion measure is not compatible with the proportionality principle,176 which means 
that the legislative action taken by the EU should not exceed what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaties.177 
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In its opinion the CLS deliberates whether the proposal would impede those rights of non-
participating Member States protected by the Article 327 TFEU. According to the CLS 
the Member States have the right to decide on their own tax system and do not have to be 
subject to any tax legislation stemming from outside parties which would infringe upon 
its domestic tax system.178 The CLS claims that the proposed FTT would cause precisely 
this outcome, because the participating Member States would draft a directive that would 
affect even those Member States which are not participating in the enhanced cooperation, 
thereby taking away the right of non-participating Member States to legislate their own 
tax system.179  
 
The European Commission’s legal services came out with their own rebuttal a few months 
after the CLS had published their opinion. According to this working paper, the Article 
4(1)(f) abides by the obligations of international law concerning the application of tax 
jurisdiction and does not generate unwanted extraterritorial effects. The Commission has 
rationalised the residence principle by explaining that even if the financial institution is 
located in a non-participating Member State, it enters into the FTT jurisdiction by 
participating in a transaction with a financial institution from a participating Member 
State. Therefore the financial institution’s own actions lead to it entering a foreign 
jurisdiction.180 
  
The Commission also claims that the Article 4(1)(f) has not infringed upon the rights of 
non-participating Member States as stipulated in the Article 327 TFEU, because the 
provision has no effect on the right of those countries to decide their own tax system nor 
does it result in the use of FTT in their jurisdictions.181 The Commission justifies this 
statement by claiming that the financial institution enters into the FTT-zone jurisdiction 
by merely taking part in the transaction and thus acting within the FTT-zone, and 
therefore no rights are infringed. The Commission also states that this type of cross-border 
double-taxation is a common occurrence which simply happens to occur whenever there 
are coinciding tax legislations in place. There are no provisions in international law that 
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would forbid double taxation. While the proposed FTT aims to remove said double 
taxation, it cannot accomplish removing it completely.182 
 
Both these arguments made by the CLS and the Commission raise valid points.  When 
assessing these arguments, I find that the CLS brings forth several issues, which should 
be taken into consideration before enacting the FTT. I understand that the Commission 
can claim that the adoption of an FTT using enhanced cooperation does not violate any 
EU regulation, but in my opinion that is a feeble justification for all the problems the FTT 
is causing. The mere fact that something is legal, if it causes this many problems to other 
non-participating Member States, does not mean that it is decent and fair, which needs to 
be taken into consideration. Therefore I side with the arguments made by the CLS, but 
the ECJ disagrees. In the case United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
Council of the European Union C-209/13, the ECJ sided with the Commission on this 
matter, at least currently while the FTT is still only being drafted.183 This case will be 
further analysed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
3.3.2 Tax Avoidance 
 
The Commission modified its original proposal to add more preventive measures to help 
eradicate tax avoidance as much as it is possible. Especially the residence and issuance 
principles were designed to prevent tax avoidance and double non-taxation. Double non-
taxation means that the financial institution may be able to avoid taxation in both 
countries when a cross-border transaction takes place.184 Especially now, tax avoidance 
is a current issue globally. There has always been tax havens, where people and 
companies have hidden their assets, but now that the so called Panama Papers leaked and 
revealed a massive scale of tax evasion, there seems to be even more international 
pressure to legislate these loopholes.185 Recently there have been a several new 
international agreements, which have been drafted for the purpose of eradicating tax 
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avoidance globally. As an example of said agreements are the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (hereinafter referred to as FATCA) and Common Reporting Standard 
(hereinafter referred to as CRS). 
 
FATCA and CRS are both multinational agreements which are meant to help tax officials 
internationally share income and asset information. FATCA is a bilateral agreement 
countries have with the US to share account information about the countries’ respective 
citizens.186 FATCA was first implemented in 2014187 and already fifty-five countries are 
participating in it.188 The FATCA is executed by the financial institutions in FATCA 
compliant countries, using a system where the financial institutions collect the 
information about their clients which are US citizens, and are thereby reported to the US 
tax officials. The FATCA agreement stipulates that if the clients do not want to give the 
required information, the financial institutions must withhold a tax of 30% on any 
payments from the US made to the account of the client.189 
 
On top of FATCA, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter referred to as the OECD) recently introduced the CRS, which would 
implement a system of Automatic Exchange of Information (hereinafter referred to as the 
AEOI). The European Council adopted a directive on 15 December 2014 to assimilate 
the AEOI system,190 which will enable the participating countries to share all the 
information which is relevant to the taxation of their citizens. Currently already eighty-
nine countries have committed to the enactment of the AEOI. The first information 
exchange is scheduled to start in 2017, which means that the collecting of information 
has already started. The US is not one of the participating countries of the AEOI, probably 
since they have decided to opt for the FATCA instead.191 
 
In addition to these, only recently the Commission stated that they will be amending the 
Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
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the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of 
certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC, also known as the ‘Accounting Directive’. This directive is meant to ensure 
tax transparency, and to make sure that large international corporations pay taxes where 
they make their profits. This type of tax avoidance costs the EU an estimated 50 to 70 
billion euros per year and affect around 6500 companies. So it is understandable that the 
Commission is interested in amending this regulation. The Commission also stated that 
this amendment is not likely to damage the companies’ competitiveness. The proposal 
would ensure that the companies make an annual report which states how much profits 
they generated and which countries they paid the taxes to from those profits.192  
  
There are several different methods of tax avoidance that may be utilised after the 
implementation of the FTT. These methods are for example switching financial 
instruments or market migration.193 Firstly, the financial institution will probably search 
for alternative instruments where possible if those instruments do not fall within the scope 
of the FTT. This may cause issues when other products may become more popular than 
other, and there is a damaging market shift in this aspect. This may therefore end up 
harming several companies, which have issued certain securities which are taxed under 
the FTT. Secondly, the implementation of the FTT may result in the territorial relocation 
of the financial activities. The financial institutions will be more inclined to carry out its 
financial transactions in a region where there is no taxation on financial transactions, or 
if there is, said tax is significantly lower.194  
 
However, since relocating a financial institution is both expensive and difficult, this might 
not be the best method of tax evasion. The obvious solution to the market migration 
problem would be to eventually introduce a global FTT, but this is currently not likely to 
happen in the near future.195 If it is not possible to impose a global FTT, this may lead to 
inequality between markets that have chosen to impose a tax and those that have not. This 
may end up harming those locations that have chosen to implement the tax. Additionally, 
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although at first it may seem beneficial to those markets where the financial institutions 
seeking tax exile have taken refuge, eventually the situation may result in a heightened 
risk in those markets by adding instability with such artificial relocations.196 
 
To prevent tax evasion, the proposal stipulates that participating Member States must 
ensure that artificial activities carried out with the purpose of avoiding paying taxes need 
to be ignored and the tax levied regardless. The Commission calls this the principle of 
substance over form.197 However, there is a grey area when it comes to tax avoidance. 
Sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between tax avoidance and standard corporate 
tax planning, especially considering there are several national systems even within the 
FTT-zone which recognise different characteristics for illegal tax planning.198 When there 
are two options for a tax payer to choose between tax exempt transaction and taxed 
transaction, the tax payer is not obligated to the state to choose the transaction which 
would result in tax liability. CJEU has also asserted this in the case Halifax by stating in 
its judgment that taxpayers are allowed to choose to conduct their business in a way that 
will minimise their tax liability.199 
 
The Commission stated in the impact assessment that for the FTT to have the least 
unwanted effects when it comes to tax avoidance, the proposal should be enacted in the 
participating Member States at the same time, because this way the harmonisation will 
take effect immediately everywhere and not gradually throughout the FTT-zone. The 
Commission had nicknamed this simultaneous enactment as the ‘big bang’.200 
Additionally, as an anti-avoidance measure the Commission also sought the tax to have a 
broad base and to cover most types of securities to minimize tax evasion through the 
utilisation of alternative financial instruments.201 
 
The Commission has tried in the latest proposal to ensure as much as feasible to close 
those tax avoidance loopholes by having the FTT scope cover all possible financial 
institutions and instruments. In the impact assessment it was suggested that on top of the 
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issuance and residence principles, it would be even more effective if the FTT were to 
cover financial transactions which take place within the FTT-zone, even if the financial 
institutions which partake in the transaction are not located in the FTT-zone.202 The 
issuance principle specifically has been added to the latest proposal as an anti-avoidance 
measure.203 In the impact assessment the Commission estimated that the issuance 
principle would help gather around 10% of the transactions in shares and debt securities 
issued by the entities located in the participating Member States. It should be noted that 
at the time of the impact assessment participating Member States included Estonia, which 
has later left the group. According to the Commission the issuance principle would bring 
revenues of 0.39 billion euros from taxation of shares and 0.83 billion euros from taxation 
of bonds and bills.204 
 
So as we can see, tackling the issue of tax avoidance is truly a current issue. The global 
cooperation and financial transparency has increased in the recent years, and seems to be 
still growing. It is understandable that the governments are tempted to tackle this issue, 
since they may end up losing billions in tax revenues due to tax avoidance. On the other 
hand, the Commission needs to evaluate are the benefits from adopting the proposal 
greater than what negative impacts the tax avoidance may have on the European market.  
 
3.3.3 Double Taxation 
 
The CLS stated in its opinion that while the residence and issuance principles may prevent 
tax avoidance, it does trigger double taxation. Additionally, although within the FTT-
zone there is a system of tax relief on a reciprocity basis, there is no such system in place 
when it comes to the transactions between participating Member states and non-
participating Member States or third countries.205 The tax relief system between the 
participating Member States operates on the basis that the taxing powers are allocated to 
the Member State where the financial institution is located.206 
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The Commission admitted that there may be some double taxation or double non-taxation 
that will unavoidably occur, as is the case of all cross-border transaction taxes that are 
enacted. The Commission also expresses that customary international law does not 
prohibit double taxation. CJEU has also on several occasions held that EU primary law 
does not forbid it. Nonetheless, the Commission also claimed that the very purpose of the 
proposal is to decrease existing double taxation. The proposed FTT would in fact 
harmonize and thus eradicate national systems of financial transaction taxes, and 
therefore it would decrease double taxation within the FTT-zone.207 
 
When reading the impact assessments made by the Commission, it seems evident that the 
Commission does not see a genuine problem with double taxation, because it can be so 
easily solved with simply making all Member States in the EU participate in the FTT, 
when there would only be one model of taxing financial instruments. Currently there may 
be only ten countries participating in the enhanced cooperation, but if the proposal 
becomes a directive, other countries may not have any other option but to join the FTT 
jurisdiction. Perhaps this has been the desired outcome all along. By first starting with a 
small group of Member States and establishing the FTT-zone, and then eventually other 
Member States will be forced to join. The Commission also claimed that another possible 
solution to prevent double taxation would be a bilateral agreement between participating 
and non-participating countries.208  
 
Soone rebuts these claims made by the Commission in the article he wrote for Intertax, 
arguing that these are not effective solutions. Firstly he reasons that even if all the 
Member States participate in the FTT and there were a single taxation model, the model 
would still not cover all types of transactions. The FTT has left out certain financial 
transactions, and therefore participating Member States may have another type of tax in 
place in its jurisdiction. This might lead to double taxation even if the country is 
participating in the FTT and the FTT-zone was EU-wide. Secondly he states that the 
bilateral agreements suggested by the Commission would not work, because Soone 
claims that these agreements can only concern taxation of income and capital, and that 
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the FTT is undoubtedly not a tax on income or capital. Given that the FTT is an indirect 
tax, this type of bilateral agreement would not solve the problem of double taxation.209 
 
3.3.4 Other Legal Problems 
 
On top of those three major problems the proposal is facing, there are several less 
significant yet still important issues generated if the FTT is enacted. One of these issues 
is for example the issue of liability. If the FTT happens to have negative economic effect 
on the non-participating Member States, somebody may end up suing for damages. The 
core of the problem is figuring out who is going to be liable for said damages.210 
According to Article 340 TFEU the EU shall cover any damage caused by one of its 
institutions in the performance of its duty.211 According to the judgment in the case 
Dubois the liability of the EU can only be attained if the breach concerns a higher-ranking 
rule of law for the protection of individuals.212 Considering that the several issues facing 
the FTT are allegedly in breach of TFEU, which is a higher-ranking rule of law than the 
proposed directive, it can be deduced that there may be some Member States that will be 
entitled to damages.213 Therefore some might argue that it is not fair to non-participating 
Member States that a directive legislated by ten Member States may result in damages 
paid by the whole EU. 
 
Additionally, there is the issue concerning whether the FTT will achieve the wanted 
outcome concerning negative speculative trading. As previously mentioned, one of the 
objectives of the FTT is to deter negative speculative trading. It cannot be proven that the 
FTT will actually achieve such an objective, or if this tax will only effect negative 
speculative trading, or also speculative trading, which can have a positive effect on the 
market. There are some hypothetical models for determining whether speculative trading 
is undesirable or not, and thereby direct the tax towards these negative transactions. 
However, there are no guarantees that such a model actually works.214 There are some 
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theories that claim that by increasing transaction costs the volatility will decrease, thereby 
the assets which would have been used for speculative trading will be instead used 
towards investments which are more beneficial to the market. Alternatively, there are also 
theories that introducing an FTT would lead to a shift towards negative net effect, leading 
to lower transaction volumes, higher volatility, lower liquidity, and higher costs for the 
economy.215 
 
Furthermore, the FTT may have an undesirable impact on the efficiency of the financial 
market. There are a number of reasons why efficiency is crucial to the functioning of the 
financial markets. Firstly the tax can discourage the investors from selling overprized 
instruments, which leads to the deficiency of said instruments on the market, thereby 
making that instrument all the more overprized. This in turn leads to a so-called 
speculative bubble, which means a circumstance where the instrument is valued at its 
peak before the figurative bubble bursts, which again may result in a financial crisis. 
Secondly, if the market is inefficient, it may be more attractive for an investor to move to 
a different, more efficient market, especially if in this market a financial transaction tax 
is not imposed.216 
 
Moreover, this proposed tax would be removing assets from financial markets by taxing 
financial institutions, which would lead to lower liquidity of the financial market. This 
can affect other actors, for example the consumer, by increasing the prices of credit or 
adding supplementary fees imposed by the financial institutions to cover the cost of the 
tax. Also, taxing financial instruments may damage their recovery from the recent 
financial crisis.217 I find it also naïve to think that financial institutions would simply 
suffer their losses from the tax and lose revenue. I think the most likely outcome is that 
the financial institutions will trickle these costs to the consumers by imposing new fees 
or increasing the existing fees. 
 
The tax would also lead to unequal treatment of primary and secondary markets. Primary 
markets mean the transaction of newly issued securities directly from the issuer. 
Secondary market means that the financial instrument is an existing security and the 
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transaction takes place in a stock exchange. 218 The current proposal has stipulated that 
primary market transactions, including issuing securities, are left outside of the scope of 
the FTT.219 The proposal therefore puts listed and non-listed issuers at an unequal 
balance.220 
 
Furthermore, in the opinion it published, the CLS It came to the conclusion that due to 
the residence principle, the proposal will result in distortion of competition and obstruct 
the free movement of capital within the EU. This is firstly due to the fact that the financial 
institution residing in a non-participating Member States would have to pay different FTT 
rates, while the financial institutions residing in a participating Member State would 
always be subject to said State’s rate. Secondly the CLS states that these financial 
institutions residing in third countries which would be subject to the FTT cannot be 
enforced the same way as the non-participating Member States, which could result in 
distortion of competition between institutions established in third countries and financial 
institutions in non-participating Member States.221 
 
The European Commission’s legal services rebuts the claim made by the CLS by stating 
that the provision 4(1)(f) does not cause distortion of competition nor does it obstruct the 
free movement of capital, since the mere fact that a tax affecting the cross-border 
transactions is established is not in itself a restriction of free movement. It can be admitted 
that this type of taxation may reduce the amount of transactions and thereby the flow of 
capital. However,  this cannot be seen as a restriction of free movement in itself, otherwise 
it would not be possible to legislate on international taxation interminably as all this type 
of taxes are likely to have similar outcomes.222 
 
All things considered, the proposal is facing quite a number of problems. Legislating 
within the EU can cause differences of opinions, but this much dissention between the 
Member States is quite uncommon. However, compared to other proposals, this specific 
one is facing much more legal problems than usual. Many of these problems the 
Commission has justified with the fact that it is acting within the realm of the law. As I 
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previously mentioned, I do not think the mere legality of the proposal makes it a sound 
idea. I think the Commission should sincerely reconsider whether all the objectives are 
































4. Supporting and Opposing Arguments 
4.1 Supporting Arguments 
 
When I started studying the supporting and opposing arguments on the FTT, I quickly 
noticed that I found significantly more opposing than supporting opinions. Especially 
after reading many legal journals, it seems like the majority of the legal experts have sided 
against the FTT. Even between the EU institutions there are different opinions, for 
example there are significant differences on how the Commission and the Council Legal 
Services view the proposal. However, countries like France and Germany have remained 
adamant and have been the biggest supporters of the FTT from the beginning. They truly 
want to make the EU-wide FTT-zone a reality.223 
 
Additionally, According to a recent Eurobarometer survey, the majority of the European 
Union citizens are in favor of the proposition. According to the survey, more than 61% 
of support the introduction of a tax on financial transactions.224 Then again, most of the 
citizens may not have the capability to fully grasp the consequences of the FTT, nor what 
the tax will actually mean especially for the economy. In the aftermath of the Eurozone 
crisis, most of the citizens find the banks to be in the blame and want to make them pay 
their share of the fallout, and not only rely on the taxpayers’ money or funding from the 
bailouts. This is one of the key points the supporters of this tax have emphasized, the 
sharing of the financial burden caused by the financial crisis. In a slightly propaganda-
esque move, even some of the newspapers have given the proposed tax the nickname 
‘The Robin Hood Tax’ which would indicate that this money takes from the rich and 
gives to the poor.225 For me this just seems like the governments have wanted to 
implement more taxation on the financial sector for some time now, but this extensive 
support from the citizens has given them finally the opportunity and momentum to 
actually push this tax through. The FTT would be extremely beneficial for governments 
trying to accumulate more revenues from taxing the financial sector. 
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Furthermore, the supporters of the FTT argue that the FTT would promote more 
sustainable activities in the financial markets. If enacted, the proposed FTT would help 
diminish especially the harmful kind of trading, such as speculative transactions. Thereby 
the proposal would end up making the markets more stable and prevent future crises. 
Even if the tax did not end up having such an outcome, at the minimum the tax will bring 
revenue for the participating countries. Additionally, even if the tax were to create tax 
avoidance or geographical relocation, the governments can easily monitor the effects of 
the tax and react to these loopholes by making the necessary amendments to the 
legislation. 226  
 
The supporters also claim that the lack of evidence on what will be the impacts of the 
FTT if enacted is not enough to reject the proposal. As an example, prior to the crisis 
there were many new financial products introduced to the market, which were thought to 
help complete the market. This type of new product is for example the so called Special 
Purpose Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as SPV), which bough housing loans and 
divided them into smaller portions channelling those to investment portfolios.227 When 
the housing market crashed in the US, the SPV’s were susceptible to significant losses, 
when the portfolios were composed mostly of these products. Therefore, many of these 
new products actually ended up causing the crisis. Therefore it is usually too difficult to 
actually know the real impacts of new legislation prior to the enactment.228  
 
The FTT aims to decrease the amount of transactions in the financial market to make 
them more stable. The supporters claim that the tax will only truly burden those high 
activity transactions, where the profits from the asset is low and the trade frequency high. 
These are precisely those type of transactions the FTT is meant to reduce. The FTT will 
not affect excessively those transactions where the trading activity is low, because the tax 
collected on those transactions is marginal.229 Some supporters also claim that the Stamp 
Duty of UK is actually not as well-designed as the proposed FTT. I find this a bold claim 
considering that the Stamp Duty has proven to be successful already for decades. The 
argument is that the Stamp Duty basically only applies to corporate shares and bonds, 
whereas the FTT has a much broader base. Therefore the FTT would also be more 
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effective in eliminating speculative and other trading deemed harmful to the financial 
markets.230 
 
The introduction of the FTT would also bring a new central depositary systems which 
would significantly help prevent tax evasion. While a substantial amount of securities are 
traded on official stock exchanges, the majority of trading is done over-the-counter. 
Usually this type of over-the-counter transactions are arranged with private agreements 
between the parties, where the terms and the price of the transaction are usually not public 
knowledge. Therefore there is an absence of transparency in this type of trading which 
could be fixed with a central depositary system, where even these over-the-counter trades 
would have to be registered when determining how much tax is levied on the transaction. 
This theory has already been proven to be successful with the central depositary system 
established for the collection of the Stamp Duty, which has proven to be highly 
effective.231 
 
Furthermore, even if the FTT ends up raising the costs of capital, the raise is not 
significant. The very idea of a financial transaction tax is to keep the tax burden at a 
minimal amount. Also some have argued that the FTT would impede the process of the 
investor trying to find out the actual price point of securities. However, this argument is 
based on the fact that markets are assumed to be efficient. The efficiency of markets has 
become uncertain, because the trading carried out with the common systems usually bases 
the value of financial instruments on past information, and therefore the FTT will not 
actually be the one factor that will be the downfall of an otherwise working system when 
trying to figure out the price points.232 
 
The parties opposing the FTT state that the derivatives should not be included in the scope 
of the proposal, because it would ultimately lead to an increase in hedging costs. 
However, it would be easy to create a system, where the transactions may be implemented 
in a way that the system recognises these specific type of transactions, which would be 
exempt from the FTT. When it comes to another argument made against the proposal, 
which is that the proposal will result in geographical relocation of financial transactions, 
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the issue is not as simple as it seems. There are already a lot of financial activities, which 
have relocated to more favourable markets, these so-called tax havens. In those locations 
the tax burden is usually significantly lower and thus the market place more desirable for 
investors. However, there are certain activities which are not very easily relocated. For 
example in high frequency trades, the investors must trade on certain markets, which are 
organised derivatives exchanges, such as the Eurex in Frankfurt. Additionally, 
considering that in these high frequency trades speed is very important, the investors need 
to have their servers as close as possible to the servers of the actual marketplace, 
otherwise they may lose valuable time when making these trades.233 
 
Another point made for the FTT is that if there is going to be a new tax added to the 
financial sector, the FTT is one of the best models introduced so far. If compared to the 
other proposed model, the financial activities tax (FAT), the current FTT proposal is 
estimated to meet its objectives much more likely than the FAT would have. Compared 
to the FAT, the FTT is likely to be more efficient, to have less negative effects on market 
development, and have better anti-avoidance measures. Additionally, if there is a new tax 
introduced to the financial markets, a bank levy such as the FTT seems to be the best way 
to implement it. The reasoning behind this is that out of all these different type of taxation 
models, the FTT is the one most likely to be enacted, since there is so much public opinion 
backing this tax.234 
  
Moreover, I find it interesting to note that Greece is among the participating Member 
States. The economy of Greece is still one of the most impacted after the recent crisis, so 
it might be logical that the Greece government would like to implement this tax to help 
them generate revenue. On top of generating revenue, the participating countries have 
emphasised on several occasions that the aforementioned objectives of the proposal are 
enough to justify the enactment of the FTT. However, I have not yet found reasonable 
justifications for all the all the problems the proposal would create, such as the tax 
evasion, extraterritorial effect and double taxation. These are by no means slight 
problems, but will have very real consequences to the sovereignty and economies of non-
participating Member States. Especially extraterritorial effect is something that should 
not be taken lightly. I do not believe that the objectives are enough to rationalise the 
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proposed tax, considering how many harmful ramifications it may have. Additionally, as 
previously mentioned as an example, even the Council legal services believed that the 
extraterritorial effect cannot be justified with any of the objectives of the proposed 
FTT.235 
  
4.2 Opposing Arguments 
 
When I began writing this thesis I was curious to know what local Finnish financial 
institutions thought about the proposed FTT. The financial institutions I contacted to ask 
this question were reluctant to give their own opinion, but instead they referred to the 
official statements given by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services (hereinafter 
referred to as the FFI). The FFI is an organisation which advocates Finnish financial 
institutions. Since the first proposal in 2011 the FFI has given several statements 
regarding the issue and all of these statements have conveyed that the FFI is strongly 
opposed to the FTT. According to the FFI, the FTT would have several negative impacts 
on the functioning of both the Finnish economy and the financial institutions operating 
within Finland. 
 
Due to the global nature of the financial markets, the FFI believes that a global 
participation in the tax is required in order for a financial transaction tax to succeed. The 
FFI deems it near impossible for the FTT to reach its objectives if the tax is implemented 
without global participation. However, considering that already in 2011 the crucial 
developed countries expressed that they are not interested in implementing a global FTT, 
it is very unlikely that this will become a reality in the near future. The FFI is not merely 
certain that the proposed tax is unlikely to reach its objectives, but it also believes that the 
tax will actually impact negatively on the economy and hinder the recovery from the latest 
financial crisis. They also stated that this proposal has a severe risk of being implemented 
at a critically wrong time, and at this point the proposal would be likely to do more harm 
than good. Additionally, the proposal should take into consideration other pending 
legislation or international agreements, which may tighten the current legislation on the 
                                                 




rules concerning capital and liquidity requirements of financial institutions, for example 
the Basel III proposal.236 
 
The FFI especially considers the proposed FTT to be harmful to the Finnish economy for 
numerous reasons. The cost of the tax will inevitably fall on the customers of financial 
institutions, which ultimately are Finnish companies and households. The tax will also 
hold a significant risk that it will result in tax avoidance, since it would be much more 
profitable to carry out the transactions in countries where there is no tax levied on 
financial transactions. This in turn would harm the infrastructure of the domestic financial 
markets, because the volume of trade would significantly decrease. The FFI specifically 
considered that the FTT will most likely not be implemented in the UK and Sweden, and 
therefore the markets would probably shift to the UK especially. The FFI cautions the 
Finnish legislators that if Finland were to implement the FTT and Sweden in turn did not, 
there is a significant risk that the trading which takes place in the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
would shift to Sweden, and thereby make Stockholm the leading Nordic financial 
centre.237  
 
Sweden is among the strongest parties opposing the FTT and this is mainly due to the fact 
that they had implemented their own financial transaction tax from 1984 to 1991, which 
they still consider to have been a huge failure. Sweden ultimately had to abandon after 
nearly half of their securities trading relocated during this time from Stockholm to 
London.238 Some have claimed that since the UK has their own version of a financial 
transaction tax it would not make economic sense to relocate investment activities to 
London. However, the Stamp Duty applies only to trading on stocks, and the tax is not 
levied on intra-day trading nor on major trading clients. Therefore only an estimated 35% 
of all trading on shares is taxed under the Stamp Duty.239 
 
Furthermore, the FFI has deemed it unwise for Finland to partake in the enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the FTT, because it would impact on the way the Finnish 
financial institutions could operate on a daily basis. It would create a legal uncertainty, 
                                                 
236 FFI ‘Lausunto – Ehdotus Neuvoston direktiiviksi yhteisestä finanssitransaktiojärjestelmästä’ (22 
November 2011) 1. 
237 ibid 2. 
238 FFI ‘Kannanotto – Mikä on rahoitusmarkkinavero?’ (18 October 2012) 1. 




which would make it even more difficult for companies to receive foreign financing, 
thereby increasing unemployment even further. The Finnish Government estimated in an 
official recommendation letter to the Finnish Parliament that implementing the tax using 
the enhanced cooperation with a limited number of participating countries would have an 
adverse impact on the Finnish economy and it will greatly diminish the efforts to recover 
the economy from the latest crisis.240 
 
Additionally, if implemented, the tax will also have a direct effect on the Finnish pension 
provisions, because the tax would be levied on certain pension funds. The tax would 
thereby reduce the proceeds which are meant to finance the payment of pension 
provisions. The Finnish Pension Alliance TELA estimated that the cost of the taxation of 
these proceeds would be approximately 450 to 530 million euros per year.241 Even if the 
Commission were to limit certain pension funds outside the scope of the proposed tax, 
the FFI states that the phrasing of the proposal is ambiguous and open for interpretation 
when it comes to these pension funds. However, the FFI has assessed that Finnish pension 
funds will not be among those pension funds which are left outside of the scope of the 
tax.242 
 
Moreover, the FFI noted that even though if one of the main objectives is to discourage 
speculative trading, it is impossible to focus the proposed tax in a way that it would only 
impact speculative trading. The FFI claims that this kind of tax cannot differentiate 
between the motives behind a transaction. Additionally, even the experts on economy 
have different opinions on whether speculative trading is harmful to the economy. Others 
believe it discourages economic development while others think it equalises economic 
growth. The FFI also deems that the Commission has severely overestimated the positive 
impacts the tax would have, especially how much revenue the tax was estimated to 
generate. As an example, the unbiased research facility Oxera has estimated that the 
Commissions impact estimate is inadequate in various aspects. The revenue collected 
from the tax is dependent on how the actors of the financial markets react to the FTT. The 
Commission has not adequately taken this into account when it published the impact 
assessment.243 
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The FFI concludes that it opposes the FTT because the current proposal would increase 
the costs of the distribution of financing products, diminish the liquidity of the financial 
markets, and distort the functioning of the internal market of the EU.244 Although this was 
just an example of how the FFI thinks about the FTT, this is the general idea that can be 
found among other non-participating Member States. Many of these countries are not 
satisfied with the current proposal, because the financial institutions within their 
jurisdiction would be taxed. Therefore non-participating Member States would contribute 
to the budget of participating Member States even though the transaction takes place in 
their jurisdiction. This is also said to have extraterritorial effect, which the biggest reason 
why the UK decided to challenge this proposal in the ECJ. This case will be studied in 
the next chapter. 
 
The UK has understandably been among those most opposed to the proposal. London is 
one on the largest financial centres in the world and the UK does not want this tax 
jeopardising the position it has attained. Additionally, the UK has got their own system 
of taxing financial transactions which has proven to be very profitable. It is reasonable 
that the UK does not want the same products to be taxed with another system, which may 
end up causing significant tax revenue losses for the UK. After the current proposition 
was published, on 26 March 2013, The House of Lords European Union Committee 
published a letter to the Secretary of Her Majesty’s Treasury pleading him to challenge 
the proposal. In said letter the House of Lords Committee heavily criticized the proposed 
FTT and also the UK government for being too passive when it came to opposing this 
proposal.245 The UK is legitimately concerned about the impacts of the proposal 
considering that the majority of the revenues produced by the tax would be generated by 
the UK.246 
 
The obvious legal arguments against the proposal are all the legal problems introduced in 
chapter three of this thesis. I will not be going over those again here, but I would like to 
state that those legal problems are one of the main reasons why, even though I have tried 
to assess impartially all these arguments supporting and opposing the proposition, but I 
cannot come to any other rational conclusion but that this proposal is not well-thought-
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out enough that it should be implemented. There are too many adverse effects the tax may 
cause, which in my opinion are not worth the risk of trying whether this tax would work 
or not. For me this tax just seems like an ill-disguised lobbying effort by various 
participating governments to increase the taxation of the financial sector with the excuse 
of making the financial institutions participate in the costs of the latest financial crisis. 
However, there is not much anyone can do about the issue if the participating Member 
States come to an agreement and start implementing the FTT. They already have the 
Council’s approval and although all EU countries are welcome to give their opinions 
during the drafting of the proposal, they do not have any actual influence if they want to 
oppose its enactment. I for one find it very dangerous for the European economy that such 
a small group of countries are allowed to legislate on this matter effecting the whole of 
the EU. 
 
4.3 The European Court of Justice  
 
Shortly after the House of Lords Committee published the aforementioned letter 
criticising the proposed FTT, on 18 April 2013 the UK submitted an application to the 
ECJ challenging the legality of enacting the FTT under enhanced cooperation.247 In its 
application to the Court the UK sought the Council decision authorising the use of 
enhanced cooperation in this instance to be annulled.248 The preamble to the decision 
made by the Council on 22 January 2013 states that the decision allows the participating 
eleven Member States to use enhanced cooperation in order to establish a mutual system 
of FTT, by utilising the pertinent provisions of the Treaties.249  
 
The UK relied on two main arguments in the case. Firstly it claimed that the proposal 
infringes on Article 327 TFEU and the adoption of the FTT would cause extraterritorial 
effects. According to the Article 327 TFEU, those countries participating in enhanced 
cooperation must respect the competences, rights and obligations of non-participating 
Member States.250 Secondly the UK pleaded that the proposal infringes on Article 332 
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TFEU, because the FTT would impose costs on non-participating Member States.251 
According to Article 332 TFEU:  
 
“Expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation, other than 
administrative costs entailed for the institutions, shall be borne by the participating 
Member States, unless all members of the Council, acting unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament, decide otherwise.”252 
 
The UK argued that the residence and issuance principles of the proposal would cause 
extraterritorial effect and therefore the decision made by the Council is in breach of 
Article 327 TFEU.253 The application of these two principles would result in taxation of 
financial institutions residing within the jurisdiction of a non-participating Member State, 
and therefore it would harmfully impact the competences and rights guaranteed in Article 
327 TFEU to those non-participating Member States.254  
 
The UK justifies its claim by stating that customary international law allows legislation 
to cause extraterritorial effects only when there is a sufficiently close connection between 
legislating party and the subject of the legislation. Only then the legislating counterparty 
can justify entering the sovereign jurisdiction of another country.255 However, the UK 
claims that applying those principles in this circumstance cannot be justified with the 
aforementioned exception given by the customary international law.256 Furthermore, the 
UK bases its second plea on the fact that it is undeniable that if the FTT is implemented, 
there would be costs to non-participating Member States. According to the UK’s claim, 
the implementation of this proposal would result in the application of the Council 
directives concerning the common system of tax collection within the EU, and therefore 
there would be costs to non-participating Member States.257  
 
Even though the defendants in the case support the admissibility of said claims, they find 
the pleas unfounded.258 The defendants rebut the first plea by claiming that the UK cannot 
oppose to the proposal which at this stage is still hypothetical. Therefore the accusation 
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of the alleged extraterritoriality of the FTT are premature and speculative.259 Secondly 
the defendants invoke the same argument, stating that because the contents of the proposal 
are not yet agreed upon, the UK cannot argue that there will be costs to non-participating 
Member States.260 
 
The Court came to the conclusion that the pleas made by the UK must be rejected and the 
action dismissed.261 Firstly the Court justifies the judgment by stating that the first plea 
the UK made claiming the Council decision breached EU law was based partly on the 
issuance principle. However, this principle was introduced in the proposal which was 
published after the Council decision.262 Secondly the Court states that the Council 
decision does not stipulate the costs stemming from the proposal, and additionally it is 
impossible to base its decision on a tax when the contents of the proposal are yet to be 
decided.263 
 
I agree with the fact that the judgment made by the Court is legal and that the Court could 
not have possibly come to any other decision under the EU treaties while the contents of 
the proposal are still to be decided upon. However, I disagree on the principles of the 
matter, because I find that the decision made by the Council was made too thoughtlessly, 
without truly thinking what consequences the decision will have for the non-participating 
Member States. For me it seems like the defendants currently have the strong argument 
they can hide behind without actually having to take a stance on or answer to any of the 
actual claims made by the UK. The only argument they currently have to make was that 
the proposal is not final, so there no sense in responding to the arguments made by the 
UK. It is actually quite interesting that the UK decided to make these claims in the ECJ, 
considering that the enactment of the proposal is still very uncertain. It is not a very 
efficient way of receiving answers. While I understand that the UK made its claim 
prematurely, and this was probably merely a political means to make their opinion clear, 
I find that they raised valid questions which remain unanswered. Perhaps the UK though 
this to be a good way to display their firm stance on the issue, or if this was actually their 
last measure to receive answers to their unanswered questions. If the proposed FTT were 
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to be enacted, then maybe the UK or another non-participating Member State can bring 
this action to the ECJ again, and perhaps this time receive actual answers to the claims 
they have made. However, until the proposal possibly is enacted, there is not much any 
































5. What Is Next for the FTT? 
 
In the impact assessment released in 2013, the Commission discloses that there were four 
different alternatives by which the FTT could have been implemented. The Commission 
has named these alternatives as options A, B, C and D. Option A is the global FTT, option 
B is the EU-wide FTT, option C is the FTT through enhanced cooperation, and option D 
is adopting the FTT outside the framework of the EU treaties.264 As previously mentioned, 
at current time option A is not realistic, and option B likewise has failed only a few years 
ago. Presently the Commission is trying to make option C succeed. Nevertheless, it was 
curious to find that the Commission had the option D as a back-up plan all along. 
 
The Commission analysed in the impact assessment that in order for the option D to be 
successful, it is crucial that a critical mass of Member States would participate in the 
system of taxation outside of the EU treaties. Firstly there has to be a large enough 
geographical area of countries participating, and secondly there has to be enough of these 
countries which represent essential countries in the financial markets. The problem with 
this plan is that the 11 Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation at that 
time showed no interest in such a system outside the EU treaties. Therefore the 
Commission comes to the conclusion that the option C is currently the only option left to 
achieve the wanted objectives.265 However, who can say what will happen in the future if 
the enhanced cooperation were to fail. Perhaps at present time the participating Member 
States would not be enthusiastic to enter such an agreement outside the EU treaties, but 
if option C fails, they may be willing to reconsider this alternative proposition.  
 
At the beginning of 2015 the participating Member States vowed to improve their 
cooperation when trying to come to an agreement about the FTT. The participating 
Member States also wanted to do their best to keep the discussion EU-wide, enabling all 
EU Member States to contribute their opinions.266 There are several principal issues of 
the proposal still under negotiation. The first issue is about the territorial application of 
the FTT. The participating Member States still need to fine-tune certain details about the 
territorial application, because this is one of the most significant basis for determining 
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which country acquires the revenue from the transaction tax. As an example, something 
that still needs to be figured out is the order in which the tax basis is determined. For 
example if the share is issued in Germany, but according to the residence principle France 
would be collecting taxes from the transaction, which of these two principles has 
priority.267 
 
The second issue the Commission is still working on is the scope of the tax. The most 
important elements that the Commission has to keep in mind when determining the scope 
of the tax is the issue of liquidity of shares and bonds, and additionally the impact the tax 
would have on public debt. The ministers of the participating Member States even issued 
a statement in May 2014 indicating that they are considering excluding public bonds from 
the scope of the tax to make sure that the negative effects on public borrowing costs and 
investors are kept at a minimum. Therefore, to limit these negative effects to public 
financing costs, the Commission is considering excluding derivatives linked to public 
bonds. Adding an exclusion of these instruments to the FTT would have to be done 
expertly to prevent tax avoidance which would in turn lead to losses in tax revenue.268 
 
Thirdly the Commission is still negotiating the taxable amount. There are certain short-
term financial instruments that the Commission is considering to have a lower tax rate, 
such as repos, money market instruments, and certain derivatives. These could be taxed 
at a different rate by for example dividing the taxable amount with a time-dependent 
factor. Another issue about the taxable amount under consideration is whether it would 
be more beneficial to tax derivatives with a notional tax amount. Additionally another 
issue still under contemplation is whether the tax should be levied on gross transactions 
or on net positions at the end of a trading day. In their national financial transaction taxes 
some of the participating Member States, such as Belgium and Greece, have opted to go 
with gross taxation, while France and Italy have implemented an FTT using net 
taxation.269 
 
Fourthly the excludable counterparts in a transaction chain are still under negotiation. 
What this means is that the principle rule of the FTT is that all transactions are taxed. 
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However, in practice sometimes a single transaction is siphoned through a distributor and 
therefore there are technically two transactions which take place, first from the origin to 
the distributor, and then from the distributor to the investor. The Commission wants to 
avoid this type of double taxation within one transaction and is trying to come up with a 
sensible solution, possibly excluding these distributors from the scope of the FTT.270 
 
Lastly the mode of tax collection is still under deliberation and the Commission is 
assessing a few different options. They could opt for a simple model, which would be 
based on self-administration and delegation of collecting responsibilities. Alternatively, 
they could base the tax collection on financial infrastructure, which would be a more 
centralised approach. The first model would be easy to implement quickly, and it would 
be cheap for the governments, but on the other hand there would not be a reliable 
monitoring system in place, which would in turn possibly lead to revenue losses. The 
second model would be expensive to implement at first, because the model would be 
implemented with an automated process. However, the possibility to monitor the 
transactions is much more reliable than with the first model. 271 
 
The most recent meeting the participating Member States held was in December 2015. 
They discussed all the aforementioned unresolved issues, but several articles still remain 
unsettled. However, since the directive requires unanimous agreement of all the 
participating countries, there are still a lot of struggles ahead for them before unanimity 
can be reached. In the statement published in the press release in December 2015 the 
participating Member States declared that they intend on resolving all of the issued by the 
end of June 2016.272 All in all, it can be said that this type of taxation is not meant as a 
temporary system of taxation, until the European economy has recuperated. If this tax is 
implemented, it will likely spread to other European countries. Who can tell if eventually 
this tax will spread globally, especially if the Eurozone implementation proves to be 
successful? 
 
However, as can evidently be seen, the Commission still has several issued that need to 
be figured out before the participating Member States can come to an agreement about 
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the final draft. To an outsider it may seem like there is little to no progress, but there has 
been a lot of thought and effort that has gone into the minor details of the proposal. 
However, it still remains to be seen, what the ten participating Member States will be 
deciding later this year. It does seem like they are at a crucial crossroads when it comes 
to the development of the FTT under enhanced cooperation. They have postponed the 
actual decision-making and enactment so many times already that the time to decide the 
future of the FTT is at hand. I find it hard to believe that this project can be postponed 
anymore and hopefully the decision about the FTT will actually be made by the end of 
June, whether the decision is about annulment of the proposal or about the participating 
Member States have finally reaching unanimity. With any luck the decision will not be 
another in a long line of postponements, so that the proposal can finally come to a 




























There has been a trend lately to promote transparency in the area of taxation, and make 
international corporations pay their fair share. Especially recently, a lot of people are 
angered by the Panama Papers scandal, which unearthed significant tax evasion, Even 
prior to this there are already the multinational tax evasion agreements CRS and FATCA 
which have entered into force in recent years. So it seems that the legislators globally 
want to make the taxation of the financial sector both transparent and add taxation levied 
on financial transactions.  
 
For the legislators lobbying for additional taxation, this political and economic climate is 
the opportune moment to do so. The economy is still recovering from the latest financial 
crisis and this effects even ordinary citizens daily. The financial institutions and investors 
are seen as rich entities who are seedily evading taxes, and should finally have to 
contribute their fair share. Even according to the latest survey, the participating Member 
States have the support of the European Union citizens backing them. However, 
sometimes the public opinion is easily influenced and the voters cannot always 
understand the wide-ranging consequences the so-called ‘Robin Hood Tax’ may have. 
Additionally, some have argued that this proposal has a significant risk of being 
implemented at a critically wrong time, and currently the proposal would be likely to be 
more damaging than beneficial. 
  
The Commission has stated that one of the most important objectives of the FTT is to 
make the financial sector more stable and thereby prevent future crises. However, the 
issue may not be as simple as this. It is really uncertain whether the financial crisis is even 
preventable with the instruments implemented with the proposed FTT. History has proven 
that economic and legal experts have sometimes been near certain that a new legislation 
will have a specific effect. However, when this new legislation has been implemented the 
new regulation will actually not achieve the wanted outcome, but additionally it will end 
up causing additional problems on top of the existing ones. Therefore, even though the 
objectives may seem sincere, the legislators should always be careful and avoid being 
overly optimistic when assessing what type of impacts a new legislation may have. 




considering that the impact assessment published by the Commission seems to be 
somewhat overly optimistic. 
 
It cannot be denied that the financial sector in the EU does seem under-taxed, especially 
considering the fact that it is exempt of VAT. The current taxation arrangements of the 
financial sector is fairly advantageous for the financial players and this has been the case 
for a long time. The politicians have been pressured to make the financial sector 
contribute more towards the common budget and now the political climate has shifted 
enough that they actually can finally make this change. I cannot blame them for being 
tempted to introduce additional taxation considering that the current proposal is estimated 
to bring total revenues of 34 billion euros. I find it also naïve to think that financial 
institutions would simply suffer their losses from the tax and lose revenue. I think the 
most likely outcome is that the financial institutions will trickle these costs to the 
consumers.  
 
The financial transaction tax is by no means a new idea, but now it has merely been re-
introduced because especially after the recent financial crisis there is currently a concrete 
reason to start adding taxation to the financial sector. So even though there is a lot of talk 
that the financial crisis was the starting point for concrete planning of a FTT, maybe the 
reality of situation is actually that the FTT was already an appealing idea to the 
governments prior to the crisis, but the crisis just enabled the planning to finally be taken 
seriously. Even in the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2011 proposal, the Commission 
has stated that The EU is currently reforming a lot of the regulation concerning the 
financial sector. However, it is difficult to assess whether the FTT would end up making 
the EU too unattractive to possible investors and there would be significant geographical 
relocation of the markets. 
 
Relocation of the market place is just one of the several problems the FTT is estimated to 
face is it is implemented. The main problems caused by the FTT are extraterritorial effect, 
tax evasion, and double taxation. The Commission has belittled these problems and stated 
that they are acting within the limits of the EU Treaties. This has been proven by the case 
UK v Council, that until the FTT is implemented, the non-participating Member States 
will not have any means to apply for an annulment in the ECJ. Perhaps one of the reasons 




FTT through, the non-participating countries will not simply stand to tolerate these 
problems caused to them, but will have no other option but to join the FTT-zone. Thereby 
the Commission would get what it originally wanted, which is the implementation of an 
EU-wide FTT. 
 
I suggest that another mode of implementation of a global FTT may be more successful 
than the current proposal. I would call it ‘an almost global FTT’. Even though trying to 
reach an agreement on the current proposal has been lengthy and difficult, it is not 
impossible to find enough nations in the world to reach a nearly global agreement. 
Additionally, considering that recently there have been successful multinational 
agreements on sharing taxation information, such as the CRS and FATCA, it is not a 
completely precluded option that a majority of the countries may come to a similar 
agreement in the future concerning a nearly global financial transaction tax. In my opinion 
this type of model has the potential of being the most successful. The requirement for this 
model to succeed is that there needs to be the critical mass of significant countries 
participating in the agreement. These necessary countries are for example the United 
States, the UK, Germany, Hong Kong, and Singapore, since these countries host the 
biggest financial centres in the world. 
 
However, it is still too soon to know what conclusion the participating Member States 
will come to by the end of June 2016, which is only a few months away. If the enhanced 
cooperation will fail, then maybe the planning towards a global or intra-EU multinational 
agreement is likely to begin. The Commission has already done a lot of work in planning 
the proposal for the past five years, and also there seems to be too much momentum for 
this type of taxation to stop the planning here. There have to be considerable reasons why 
even the participating Member States have not yet even after all these years given up on 
the idea of the FTT, but stayed committed to the proposal. 
 
However, trying to remain impartial to the current proposal has been difficult. I believe 
that there are simply too many negative impacts and legal problems the FTT may have. 
All the legal and economic problems stated previously have too many and too extensive 
consequences for ten Member States to decide upon. I find it reckless that a minority 
group of EU countries are given permission to implement taxation that will effect non-




reasonable decision the participating Member States should come to in June is that either 
the current proposal needs to be altered significantly, or the planning of implementation 
must cease. 
